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Abstract
This article reviews the events surrounding two prominent arbitration decisions related to
two Indonesia geothermal power projects sponsored by CalEnergy Company, Inc. (”CalEnergy”),
known as the Patuha and Himpurna projects, and a Pakistani power project developed by the Hub
Power Company, Ltd. (”HubCo”). The aggressive involvement of local courts in the CalEnergy
and HubCo proceedings does not reassure investors relying on the perceived neutrality of inter-
national arbitral institutions to mitigate the risk of uncertain justice in unstable countries. The
author asks: Are problems between State entities in troubled developing countries and interna-
tional project sponsors simply not arbitrable as a practical matter when economic and political
crisis intersect in a highly corrupt economy? Or, are there means of protecting the arbitrability
of investor-State disputes in the midst of such turmoil? This review concludes that few devices
will be effective to overcome these hurdles. Thus, arbitration may in reality be a fiction in such
circumstances upon which investors should not rely exclusively.
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Mark Kantor*
Professor Priyatna was visibly upset and said words to the ef-
fect that we had worked together closely as colleagues he
hoped we would still be friends and that he was sorry but
hoped I would understand that he had to leave.
I told him that a court ruling in The Hague delivered earlier
that day had not stayed the arbitration and that therefore the
hearings could continue.
He replied that when he was about to leave Washington on
Sunday an Indonesian whom he did not know but who
presented himself as coming that day from Jakarta to read
him a letter said to be from a Minister warning him not to go
forward with the arbitrations. He was not given a copy of the
letter.
Professor Priyatna informed me that when he arrived at
Schiphol airport on the morning of Monday 20th September,
he was met by a Mr. Warrow who had come from Jakarta to
read to him the same letter instructing him not to attend the
arbitration hearings. With Mr. Warrow was Mr. Husein of the
Indonesian Embassy.
Professor Priyatna apologised and said that he had been told
he could not telephone or contact either Mr. Paulsson or my-
self and was placed in the Ibis Hotel at the airport with Em-
bassy personnel. He identified to me at the airport Mr. War-
row, Mr. Husein, and a Mr. Hadianto also of the Embassy.
Professor Priyatna told me that he was being accompanied
back to Jakarta ....
He was visibly upset throughout the entire discussion with me
* Mr. Kantor recently retired from partnership at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & Mc-
Cloy LLP, where his practice focused on international finance and investment. He is
currently writing about a variety of legal and business topics and teaching at Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. A qualified arbitrator, he may be reached at
mkantor@attglobal.net.
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which lasted about 10 minutes, and for some period was close
to tears.1
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration over international project financings in develop-
ing countries is not a dry topic. Recent high-profile arbitrations
about project financings address allegations of bribes, kickbacks
and corruption,2 the collapse of entire economies,' wholesale re-
jection of contracts,4 political crises and coups,5 claims of human
1. Statement of Mr. Albert de Fina, one of three arbitrators in the cases concern-
ing the impact of the suspension by the Government of Indonesia of two geothermal
power projects sponsored by CalEnergy Inc. ("CalEnergy"). Mr. de Fina's statement
recounted a meeting at Schiphol Airport in The Netherlands with Professor H. Priyatna
Abdurrasyid, the arbitrator appointed by the Government of Indonesia, on the day
before hearings scheduled by the Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague. See Patuha Power Ltd.
(Bermuda) v. Republic of Indon. (Interim Award, Sept. 26, 1999), 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP. B-1, B-27-28 (2000) [hereinafter Patuha-ROI Interim Award]. That meeting fol-
lowed investigatory efforts by Mr. de Fina, Mr. Jan Paulsson (President of the Arbitral
Tribunal), and Professor Albert van de Berg to locate Professor Priyatna after learning
that Professor Priyatna had failed to arrive at his chosen hotel and that his reservation
had been cancelled by a staff member of the Indonesian Embassy. Id. at B-23-28.
2. See HubCo Judgment Transcript in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Appellate Jurisdic-
tion), Civil Appeal No. 1398 and 1399 of 1999, Civil Appeal No. 1398 of 1999, The Hub Power
Company Limited v. Pakistan WAPDA and Federation of Pakistan, 16 ARB. INT'L 439, 456-58
(2000) [hereinafter HubCo v. WAPDA], reprinted in 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-1
(2000); Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (May 4,
1999), 14 MEALEv'S Ir'L ARB. REP. B-i, B-23-24 (1999) [hereinafter Patuha-PLN Final
Award].
3. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-30 ("Indonesia found itself in a ca-
lamitous economic crisis."). The award quotes counsel to PT (Persero) Perusahaan
Listruik Negara ("PLN") as follows:
The Tribunal has to address the claims which are before it against the back-
ground of the economic collapse that preceded the presidential decrees in the
last quarter of 1997 and made them necessary .... In 1998 to 1999, the
Indonesian economy contracted by 15 percent, resulting in more than 5 mil-
lion workers losing theirjobs. The rupiah ... has lost more than 80 percent of
its value since the crisis first erupted .... Out of a population of 200 million,
the number of seriously poor people in Indonesia is projected to reach 130
million in 1999 ....
Id.
4. Twenty-seven independent power projects ("IPPs") were forced into suspension
or renegotiation in Indonesia. See The Future of Independent Power Producers, INDON. COM.
NEWSL., Dec. 19, 2000. Nineteen Pakistani projects under construction were harassed
or cancelled by the Pakistani government. See Hill, A Military Coup Doesn't Change the
Fact that Pakistan is Under Contract to Pay Western Power Producers for Electricity it Can't Af-
ford, PROJEur FIN., Nov. 1999, at 109. Intervention into power projects in recent years
has not been limited solely to these two countries. For example, in August 1995, the
State Government of Maharashtra, India, announced its intention to stop construction
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rights violations,' injunctions against arbitration,7 and awards in
the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars,8 as well as such outra-
geous extra-judicial interference as the forced return of Profes-
sor Priyatna from The Netherlands to Indonesia. The most
prominent of these decisions relate to two Indonesian geother-
mal power projects sponsored by CalEnergy Company, Inc.
("CalEnergy") (now MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company),
known as the Patuha and Himpurna projects, and a Pakistani
power project developed by the Hub Power Company, Ltd.
("HubCo"). In the two Indonesian transactions, arbitrators con-
tinued with proceedings and issued large awards against the Re-
public of Indonesia ("Republic" or "GOI") and its State-owned
electricity utility, PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara
("PLN"), all despite anti-arbitration injunctions issued by an In-
donesian court. In the HubCo transaction, conversely, the Pakis-
tani Supreme Court upheld an anti-arbitration injunction stop-
ping International Chamber of Commerce arbitration proceed-
ings brought by HubCo against the Pakistani State-owned
of the US$2.8 billion Dabhol power project on the alleged grounds that the electricity
tariff was unaffordably high, the project was environmentally unsound and the bidding
process was not transparent. See Marcus W. Brauchli, Enron Project is Scrapped by India
State, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at A3; see also Danielle Mazzini, Stable International Con-
tracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered Species?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 343, 352-53 (1997).
5. See Hill, supra note 4 (discussing impact on private power projects of replace-
ment of Ms. Benazir Bhutto by Mr. Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister of Pakistan and later
coup by General Pervez Musharraf). The fall of President Suharto from power in Indo-
nesia is also intimately related to the many power project disputes in that country. See
The Future of Independent Power Producers, supra note 4 (noting 14 independent power
projects in which Suharto family or friends participated); Evelyn Iritani, The Ties that
Bind: Firms Try to Steer Clear of Suharto Family Backlash, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1998, at D1
(specifying 10 IPPs with ties to Suharto family members or friends).
6. See The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations, Human
Rights Watch (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/enron/in-
dex.htm (alleging human rights violations associated with Dabhol project in India spon-
sored by Enron).
7. See HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2 (upholding lower court injunction on public
policy grounds); Patuha-ROI Interim Award, supra note 1, at B-1 1-12 (describing anti-
arbitration injunction issued by Central Jakarta District Court). A similar injunction
was sought, but never granted, in litigation about the Dabhol project in India. See
Dabhol, Fight Goes to Court, INT'L GAS RFP., Sept. 15, 1995.
8. See Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, 14
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-1, A-57 (1999) [hereinafter Himpurna-PLN Final Award]
(awarding US$391,711,652 to Himpurna California Energy Ltd.); Patuha-PLN Final
Award, supra note 2, at B-48 (awarding US$180,570,322 to Patuha). Himpurna and
Patuha were sister Indonesian geothermal power projects, each developed by Mid-
American Energy Holdings Co. (formerly CalEnergy).
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electric utility, the Pakistan Water and Power Development Au-
thority ("WAPDA"). Common to both sets of disputes were se-
vere foreign exchange crises in the host country, allegations of
corruption in obtaining the power contracts, and national politi-
cal instability.
The aggressive involvement of local courts in the CalEnergy
and HubCo arbitration proceedings does not reassure investors
relying on the perceived neutrality of international arbitral insti-
tutions to mitigate the risk of uncertain justice in unstable coun-
tries. The results of these arbitrations must give one pause. Are
problems between State entities in troubled developing coun-
tries and international project sponsors simply not arbitrable as a
practical matter when economic and political crisis intersect a
highly corrupt economy? Or, are there means of protecting the
arbitrability of investor-State disputes in the midst of such tur-
moil?
The Indonesian and Pakistani controversies offer an oppor-
tunity to consider these issues, but the picture is not comforting.
The local courts in both countries appeared intent on prevent-
ing arbitral enforcement of these high-profile public contracts.
Broadly accepted judicial doctrines protecting international ar-
bitration from judicial interference were ignored. The ability of
the host State to take unilateral action in the midst of crisis was
protected. Clear contractual language was given short shrift.
Opposition to the right of foreign investors to employ arbitra-
tion was not limited to cases involving the State; local courts ob-
structed arbitration even in transactions solely between private
parties. Conversely, the contractual and financial devices em-
ployed by international investors to force resolution of difficult
disputes into independent arbitral proceedings had ultimate
utility only if a valuable asset (political risk insurance) existed
outside the reach of the host State. Perhaps this result is not
very surprising; independent power projects in both countries
were large, politically visible programs that had attracted signifi-
cant local opposition even before the economic crisis hit Asia.
Corruption in each country has been pervasive and allegedly
reached the highest levels. Foreign investors were often re-
sented by local interests. Notwithstanding rapid economic
growth in the 1980s and 1990s, Indonesia and Pakistan are weak
States with a history of instability and unreliable political and ju-
dicial systems. Moreover, the project contracts in question allo-
11252001]
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cated to these weak States the financial consequences of
macroeconomic changes like a currency crisis no matter how dif-
ficult to absorb.
In an effort to evaluate the limits of effective arbitration, I
will review the events surrounding these recent arbitrations.
That review leads me to conclude that few devices will be effec-
tive to overcome these hurdles. Thus, arbitration may in reality
be a fiction in such circumstances upon which investors should
not rely exclusively.
Let us turn first to the Indonesian cases.
Professor Priyatna was the unfortunate GOI-appointed arbi-
trator in one of two arbitrations involving the geothermal power
projects in Indonesia sponsored by CalEnergy. In December
1994, PLN and Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"), the State-owned petroleum com-
pany, entered into Energy Sales Contracts ("ESC") with special-
purpose project companies established as subsidiaries of
CalEnergy, respectively Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Ber-
muda) ("Himpurna") and Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda)
("Patuha"). 9 Under the Himpurna ESC, Himpurna agreed as
contractor' to develop a multi-unit power project at the Dieng
geothermal field on Java. PLN in turn committed to pay a U.S.
Dollar-denominated tariff for available electricity from that pro-
ject for a period of thirty years. Similarly, Patuha agreed under
the Patuha ESC as contractor to develop a generating facility at
the Patuha geothermal field, also in Java, with PLN again agree-
ing to pay a U.S. Dollar tariff for a thirty-year period. At the
same time, Pertamina and the respective project company en-
tered into ajoint Operation Contract ('JOC") relating to opera-
tion of the geothermal field that would be the source of underly-
ing energy. Each ESC andJOC was also "approved... on behalf
of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia" by the Indone-
sian Minister of Mines and Energy, by signature at the end of the
9. See Patuha-PLNFinalAward, supra note 2, at B-2. The following summary of facts
is taken largely from the Patuha-PLN Final Award and from the author's personal knowl-
edge of development and financing of Indonesian private power projects (and contains
only information publicly available).
10. The characterization of the project company as "contractor," rather than
.owner," was necessary to comply with Indonesian requirements for development of
geothermal resources in cooperation with Pertamina.
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documents."' Moreover, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance is-
sued letters (each, an "MoF Letter") to each project company
undertaking that "[a] s long as the [project company's] material
obligations which are due under the ESC and JOC have been
fulfilled, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia will cause
Pertamina and PLN, their successors and assigns, to honor and
perform their obligations as due in the above-mentioned con-
tracts." The ESCs, JOCs, and MoF Letters in the two transactions
were substantially identical, except as required by the identity of
the project company and physical differences between the two
power projects. 12 Each ESC, JOC, and MoF Letter contained a
provision under which disputes relating to the relevant docu-
ment would be settled by arbitration in Jakarta, Indonesia, under
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UN-
CITRAL") rules. 3
11. See Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-2. In the early 1990s, the Minis-
ter of Mines and Energy had executed Energy Sales Contracts ("ESCs" or "ESC") and
Joint Operation Contracts ('3OCs" or "'OC") for geothermal private power projects by
signing under the word "guaranteed." However, at about the time that Mines and En-
ergy, PLN, and Pertamina were finalizing project documents for a number of geother-
mal power projects, the Republic of Indonesia ("Republic" or "GOI") and PLN were
negotiating project documents for a number of non-geothermal power projects under a
general framework for private power projects. Id. at B-19-21. The general framework
did not authorize the issuance of Government guarantees of the obligations of PLN
under power purchase agreements. Instead, the practice developed of having the Indo-
nesian Ministry of Finance issue letters of support substantially in the form discussed
infra in the text. Consistent with this approach, the Ministry of Mines and Energy re-
placed the word "guaranteed" with "approved" for its signature on project documents
for geothermal power projects, and the GOI issued letters of support for the geother-
mal projects as well.
12. Compare text of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance issued letter ("MoF Let-
ter"), quoted in Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. Republic of Indonesia (Final Award, October
16, 1999), 15 MEALY'S INT'L AR. REP. B-1 (2000) [hereinafter Patuha-ROIFinal Award],
with text of MoF Letter, quoted in Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Bermuda) v. Republic of
Indonesia (Final Award, Oct. 16, 1999), 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REp. A-i (2000) [herein-
after Himpurna-ROI Final Award]. The operative language in support letters from the
MoF in other independent power projects was slightly different: "[T]he Government of
the Republic of Indonesia will cause PLN, its successors and permitted assigns, to dis-
charge PLN's payment obligations under the [power purchase agreement] which are
due and payable and unsatisfied by PLN." See, e.g., AAP NEWSFEED, RELATING TO EEC,
Sept. 2, 1998 (quoting MoF Letter relating to PT Energi Senkang power project); see
also Patuha-ROIFinal Award, supra at B-12-13 (discussing differences between phrase "to
honor and perform their obligations as due" found in MoF Letters and phrase "to cause
PLN ... to discharge PLN's payment obligations under the PPA"); see id. at B-14-15
(discussing restriction on guarantees).
13. See, e.g., Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-4-5 (an example of the
arbitration provisions in an ESC). The arbitration provisions in the Himpurna ESC
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The actual formulation of the scope of authority of the arbi-
tral tribunals differed as between the ESCs and the MoF Letters.
Section 8.2 of the ESCs provided the following:
Disputes, if any, arising between PLN on the one hand, and
PERTAMINA and/or COMPANY on the other hand, relating
to this Contract or the interpretation and performance of any
of the provisions of this Contract ... shall be referred to and
finally resolved by binding arbitration as set forth in Section
8.3 below.14
Section 8.3 of each ESC then further provided that disputes were
to be settled by a three-member arbitral panel under UNCI-
TRAL arbitration rules. The Secretary General of the Interna-
tional Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
was designated as appointing authority and Jakarta was specified
as the site of arbitration. Moreover, under Section 8.4 of the
ESCs, the parties renounced statutory rights under the Indone-
sian Code of Civil Procedure and applicable Indonesian law and
regulation to appeal the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal ("Tri-
bunal"), and agreed to not seek judicial intervention in the arbi-
tral proceedings. In addition, the parties agreed that:
[N] o Party shall have any right to commence or maintain any
suit or legal proceeding concerning a dispute hereunder un-
til the dispute has been determined in accordance with the
arbitration procedure provided for herein and then only for
enforcement of the award rendered in such arbitration.1 5
The arbitration provision of the MoF Letters was simpler,
but nevertheless was equally exhaustive. "Any dispute or claim
arising out of or relating to this letter shall be settled by arbitra-
tion under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in effect at the time of
the arbitration, in Jakarta and otherwise in accordance with the
procedural provisions set forth in Section 8.3 of the ESC. '1 6 Ac-
cordingly, the parties in the Himpurna and Patuha projects were
were identical. As the project documents were virtually identical for the two transac-
tions, the reader should hereafter presume identical provisions unless otherwise noted.
Equally, since the arbitrators were identical and the text of the decisions were virtually
identical (except as required by technical project differences or the stage of project
development), where the Patuha and Himpurna awards cover the same ground in a
substantively identical manner, in the interest of convenience I will cite only to the
Patuha award.
14. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-4.
15. Id.
16. Patuha-ROI Final Award, supra note 12, at B-1.
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diligent in their efforts to establish arbitration as the sole forum
for resolution of disputes relating to the ESCs and MoF Letters,
to the exclusion of national courts save only for actions to en-
force any eventual arbitration awards. Perhaps counsel for the
project companies left the negotiating table well satisfied by
these provisions, but later events, would demonstrate that even
the best-drafted clauses can simply be ignored by local courts.
The ESCs provided for Indonesian law as the governing
law.17 However, the parties to the ESC also agreed upon the fol-
lowing:
[T]he Tribunal need not be bound to strict rules of law
where they consider the application thereof to particular mat-
ters to be inconsistent with the spirit of this Contract and the
underlying intent of the Parties and as to such matters their
conclusion shall reflect their judgment of the correct inter-
pretation of all relevant terms hereof and the correct and just
enforcement of this agreement in accordance with such
terms.
18
The MoF Letters contained no explicit governing law
clause, but did as noted above make reference to the "procedu-
ral provisions set forth in Section 8.3." Nothing in the MoF Let-
ters makes clear whether Section 8.3's instruction to follow the
spirit of the ESCs and the intent of the parties is "procedural"
and thereby incorporated into the MoF Letters.
Once the project documents were put in place by the par-
ties, the two project companies raised limited recourse finance
on the strength of, inter alia, the contractual commitments by
PLN, Pertamina, and the Government of Indonesia. As is cus-
tomary for project financings, the rights of the project compa-
nies under those commitments were assigned to the project
lenders as collateral security.19 Financial closings for the project
financings occurred in 1996 and 1997, and each project com-
pany commenced drilling, procurement, and construction activi-
ties upon the occurrence of the related closing.2 Those ordi-
nary activities were, however, soon overtaken by extraordinary
events in Indonesian and throughout the region.
17. See Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-1I (quoting Section 12 of ESC).
18. See id. (quoting Section 8.3 of ESC).
19. Patuha-ROI Final Award, supra note 12, at B-17.
20. See CalEnergy Commences Construction of Dieng 2 Geothermal Project in Indonesia, PR
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 18, 1997.
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In late 1997, the Indonesia economy shattered under the
impact of the Asian financial crisis and shortly thereafter, in
early 1998, the long-lived Suharto regime crumbled. Faced with
U.S. Dollar tariff obligations towards twenty-seven independent
power projects ("IPPs") like Himpurna and Patuha, and a
Rupiah-Dollar exchange rate fluctuating from approximately
2,400 Rupiah to the U.S. Dollar in 1996, to rates as high as
16,000 Rupiah to the U.S. Dollar in 1998, PLN considered its
obligations to purchase power from the IPPs incapable of being
performed.2 The fall of the Suharto regime also unleashed
pent up anger at manipulation of State contracts and conces-
sions to benefit Suharto family members and friends, and claims
of KKN (a Bahasa Indonesia acronym for corruption, collusion,
and nepotism) surrounded the IPP contracts as well as virtually
all other large State concessions. Soon, the Government of In-
donesia unilaterally postponed a number of IPPs and placed sev-
eral others on review status. Both Himpurna and Patuha were
suspended and PLN declined to accept power from the two facil-
22ities.
In August 1998, after several months of unsuccessful efforts
to restart the projects, Himpurna and Patuha initiated arbitra-
tion proceedings against PLN under the two ESCs and against
the Republic of Indonesia under the two MoF Letters. Neither
Himpurna nor Patuha named Pertamina as a respondent in the
proceedings. 23 At preliminary procedural meetings, PLN and
the GOI declined to consent to a single consolidated proceeding
covering both projects and claims against both PLN and the
GOI, and all parties therefore agreed to four separate arbitra-
tions.24 The order of proceeding, first against PLN and then
against the Republic, was established early by the parties on the
basis that the existence of liability on the part of the Republic
would necessarily be premised on liability of PLN under the
21. In commenting on this position almost two years later, the Arbitral Tribunal
noted that, despite the severe financial crisis, PLN had proceeded with commissioning
of a wholly-owned power plant in August 1998. See Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note
2, at B-31. Like many national utilities, PLN had long opposed IPP initiatives as over-
priced. Other observers, however, have often attributed opposition to IPPs by state
utilities to job preservation concerns and other anticompetitive motives.
22. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-2-3.
23. Id. at B-14.
24. Id. at B-5.
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ESCs.2 5 Therefore, when the arbitrations were initially com-
menced in 1998, the Republic appointed its arbitrator (Professor
Priyatna) and signed Terms of Appointment deferring proceed-
ings by the claimants against the Republic until final awards in
the PLN arbitrations were rendered.26
The two CalEnergy projects were the first IPPs to initiate
arbitration in connection with alleged breaches of project obli-
gations by Indonesia arising out of the Indonesian economic
and political crisis. To the author's knowledge, only three of the
other twenty-five Indonesian IPPs sought arbitration, and only
one of those, involving the Karaha Bodas project sponsored by
Florida Power and Light Co., has gone very far down the road of
adversarial hearings.2 7 The other projects all awaited a possible
renegotiation of their transactions, and as of this writing virtually
all are still waiting. 28 An important source of the explanation for
the difference in conduct between CalEnergy and other project
sponsors lies in the fact that CalEnergy had purchased US$290
million in equity political risk insurance from the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), the U.S. federal
agency charged with promoting American international invest-
ments, and from several private insurance syndicates on the
Lloyd's of London market.29  Unlike many other IPPs, the
25. Id.
26. Id. at B-5-7.
27. See RI Wins Arbitration Hearing in Power Contract Dispute, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 29,
2000 [hereinafter RI Wins] (quoting Indonesian counsel that "[t] he arbitration lawsuit
filed by the company against the Indonesian government was rejected by the arbitrators
because it was considered flawed in terms of procedure .... Florida Power was consid-
ered to have violated the existing procedure because it combined three different cases
in one lawsuit").
28. In mid-February 2001, PLN and IPP project company Sulawesi Energy Pty. Ltd.
announced their agreement on a renegotiated power purchase arrangement reducing
PLN's tariff obligations after almost two years of negotiations. In compensation for the
tariff reductions, the 135 MW project will be permitted to expand capacity by an addi-
tional 50 MW to meet growing demand for power on the island of Sulawesi. The spon-
sors of Sulawesi Energy include Energy Equity Corporation Ltd. of Australia, El Paso
Energy International of the United States, and PT Triharsa Sarana Jaya Purnama, an
Indonesian company affiliated with Siti Hardiyanto Rukmana, former President
Suharto's daughter. See Sulawesi Energy, PLN Reach Deal on Power Plant, JAKARTA POST,
Feb. 17, 2001.
29. See Indonesia Doesn't Pay Awards, MidAmerican Energy Gets $290 Million on Political
Risk Claim, 14 MEAEvJ's INT'L ARB. REP. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Indonesia Doesn't Pay]. The
existence of the insurance policies is not, of course, the only possible explanation of the
conduct of CalEnergy in pursuing a strategy of arbitration rather than awaiting eventual
negotiations. There are differences among the various Indonesian IPPs, including as to
2001] 1131
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CalEnergy projects thus had recourse to valuable assets located
outside Indonesia. Moreover, in circumstances like those facing
Himpurna and Patuha, OPIC and other insurers require covered
investors to "take all reasonable measures to prevent the ex-
propriatory action," which may include pursuing legal action
before honoring the claim under the policy.3 ° Therefore, the
whether allegations of corruption may be more or less well founded in particular cases.
In addition, the Indonesian government has treated some projects differently than
others. For example, the GOI and the owners of the not-yet-constructed TanjungJati A
power project agreed to terminate the power purchase agreement. See Indonesia, Inves-
tor Agree to Revoke Power Purchase Contract, AsIA PULSE, Oct. 13, 2000. The corporate style
of the investors may also be significant. See Paiton Energy Committed to PLN's Renegotiation
Program, JAKARTA POST, May 12, 1999, (quoting Hashim Djojohadikusumo, Paiton's
President Commissioner and principal behind Paiton's local partner PT Batu Hitam
Perkasa, to effect that "they [MidAmerican] are confrontationists ... [t]hat's why they
went to the arbitration court").
30. See OPIC's Investment Insurance: The Platypus of Governmental Programs and its Ju-
risprudence, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 359, 389 (1993). OPIC will not require a covered
investor to pursue such remedies when it would be futile to do so. Id. The Contracts of
Insurance issued by OPIC covering the Patuha and Dieng projects contained OPIC's
standard coverage under section 4.01(a) for expropriatory conduct, which provides for
compensation if acts (other than acts that constitute breach of contract) attributable to
the GOI deprive the insured party of its fundamental rights in its investment, violate
international law, and continue for six months. Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion, Memorandum of Determinations: Expropriation Claim of MidAmerican Energy Holdings
Company (formerly CalEnergy Company, Inc.), Contracts of Insurance Nos. E374, E453, E527,
and E759 (Nov. 10, 1999), at 9-10 [hereinafter OPIC Determinations]. Moreover, the
OPIC political risk insurance contracts for the Patuha and Dieng investments contained
a non-standard (but not uncommon) provision entitling the insured party to compensa-
tion:
if valid, final arbitral awards have been obtained against PLN or Pertamina
pursuant to the Project Agreements as a result of acts not covered by section
4.01(a) [i.e., not breaches of the Project Agreements attributable to the GOI,
which are directly excluded from coverage under Section 4.01 (a), and not acts
taken by the GOI as purchaser, supplier, creditor, shareholder, director, or
manager of the foreign enterprise, which are excluded from coverage under
Section 4.01 (a) by virtue of Section 4.03(b) of the Contracts], such awards
have also been obtained against the GOI pursuant to the GOI Support Letters,
such awards have not been paid for a period of 90 days, the nonpayment con-
stitutes a violation of international law and deprives the investor of its funda-
mental rights in the insured investment, and the Foreign Enterprises [i.e., the
project companies] were not in breach of the Project Agreements.
id. at 10. Thus, CalEnergy could recover under the OPIC insurance contracts if the
GOI refused to honor the Final Awards on account of the MoF Letters in violation of
international law. The OPIC Determinations concluded that the GOI had in fact vio-
lated international law. Id. at 11-13, 18-19. OPIC therefore determined that the GOI
had deprived MidAmerican (CalEnergy) of its fundamental rights in its investments.
Id. at 13-14, 19. Of particular interest, OPIC decided that non-payment of the arbitral
awards by the GOI was itself a violation of international law in the circumstances. Id. at
18-19. In so doing, OPIC relied upon Comment h to Section 712 of the Restatement
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project companies, their shareholders, and their limited re-
course lenders had strong incentives to move forward with arbi-
tration rather than awaiting an uncertain future of negotiations.
Although relations between the litigants in the Patuha and
Himpurna disputes were apparently quite contentious, the arbi-
trators worked steadily towards final decisions. On May 4, 1999,
the two tribunals issued parallel awards in favor of the project
companies, holding that PLN had breached the ESCs. Accord-
ingly, the tribunals terminated the ESCs and awarded damages
to Himpurna of US$391,711,652 and to Patuha of
US$180,570,322. 3 1 In so doing, the Tribunal considered and re-
jected a number of alleged defenses raised by PLN, including
the following claims: that the project companies failed to satisfy
contractual requirements in the ESCs to engage in good faith
settlement negotiations prior to initiating arbitral proceedings, 2
that the notices initiating arbitration were procedurally defi-
cient,33 that the presence of Pertamina was necessary before arbi-
tration could occur,3 4 that the ESC violated several mandatory
Indonesian laws at the time of its execution,35 that Indonesian
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which takes the position that "a state may be responsible
... if, having committed itself to a special forum for dispute settlement, such as arbitra-
tion, it fails to honor such commitment; or if it fails to carry out a judgment or award
rendered by such . .. special forum." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw §712 cmts. h, j (1999). In addition, OPIC relied upon Article II, Paragraph 1 of
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards ("New York Convention"), under which contracting States to the Convention
agree to support and enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes. See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral AwardsJune 10, 1958, art. II, para. 1,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
31. Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 8, at A-57; Patuha-PLN Final Award,
supra note 2, at B-48.
32. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-12-13.
33. Id. at B-13-14.
34. Id. at B-14.
35. Id. at B-18-23. PLN alleged that the ESC was illegal: (i) because it was not
awarded by means of competitive tender, (ii) because the sale of electricity was priced
in U.S. Dollars rather than Indonesian rupiah, (iii) because the legislation upon which
the ESC was based permitted a non-Indonesian entity to be involved in power produc-
tion in contravention of the Indonesian Constitution, and (iv) because the ESC did not
reflect a true "meeting of minds" as to the meaning and effect of the project schedule
appended to the contract. Id. at B-21-23. PLN also claimed the unilateral right to ter-
minate the ESC for an alleged non-consensual increase in generating capacity of the
facilities, notwithstanding provisions in the ESCs entitling the project companies to in-
crease capacity. Id. at B-22-23. The Patuha Unit 1 increased from 50 MW to 80 MW.
Id.; see also Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 8, at A-23 (noting increase in
Himpurna Unit 1 from 20 MW to 60 MW).
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law prevented an arbitral tribunal from ruling on a claim for ter-
mination of a contract but instead that only a judge could order
such termination,36 that decrees of the Government of Indone-
sia in 1998 suspending the projects excused PLN from breach,
that CalEnergy "may have used links with former President
Suharto to win major contracts in Indonesia,"3 8 and that the doc-
trines of changed circumstances, force majeure, and good faith
excused non-performance by PLN. 9
Having established PLN's liabilities under the ESCs,
Himpurna and Patuha then moved forward with their claims
under the MoF Letters against the GOI. Through May and into
June 1999, the project companies and the Republic sparred
36. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-14-15.
37. Id. at B-15-18.
38. Id. at B-23. These "intimations of impropriety" became much more strident
once the Arbitral Tribunal ruled against PLN and the GOI. Id. After the issuance of an
interim award holding the Republic liable under the MoF Letters, the GOI's counsel
renewed claims of corruption in the following terms:
[W]e and all parties involved in the energy sector in Indonesia, are well aware
that CalEnergy and its subsidiaries and personnel not only did not tender for
their ESC and JOC contracts as required by law, but clearly obtained them
through what is now known in Indonesia as "KKN." Counsel for PLN re-
frained from making such assertions in their submissions in the recent arbitral
references, simply because the payoffs for these contracts were done so circui-
tously and clandestinely that such assertions could not be proven. However,
that kind of conduct continued throughout the course of the relationship of
CalEnergy with its Indonesian contractual counterparts; in the manipulation
of invoices so as to appear as though there were breach where none existed,
refusal to pay their own contractors, paying huge amounts to their own per-
sonnel and head office which they later claimed as costs, falsely declaring that
they had assigned their proceeds for the benefit of lenders, when now they
intend to walk away with the full amount that they may obtain from awards or
insurance without paying off their financing (this according to internet news),
and providing false information and witnesses on points of fact and law so as
to successfully pull the wool over the eyes of the tribunal so that the truth,
being put forward by the Respondent, could no longer be seen through the
Claimants' lies. It must be Claimants' familiarity only with the world of KKN
that allows them to assume that everyone, even the Ministry of Finance and
respectable law firms, engage in such illegal and improper practices.
Patuha-ROI Final Award, supra note 12, at B-9. Indonesian counsel for the Republic also
accused the Claimants and/or their counsel of using "sophisticated surveillance devices
to 'bug' the workrooms and telephones of counsel for PLN." Id. at B-8. No proof,
"concrete or otherwise," was offered to support this allegation. Id. Indeed, after
describing a series of requests by both the claimants and the arbitrators for evidence
supporting these various assertions, the Tribunal concluded: "In sum, the Republic of
Indonesia has made exceedingly serious allegations throughout the proceedings, but
has failed to back them up with any evidence whatsoever." Id. at B-10.
39. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-30-33.
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about the very existence of the Arbitral Tribunal, notwithstand-
ing its appointment in the prior year. In early June, however,
animosity between the two sides broke apart the carefully drafted
arbitration provisions of the contracts. PLN and Pertamina
served the project companies with notice of two lawsuits filed in
the Central Jakarta District Court.4" The first, brought by
Pertamina, named the project companies, PLN, and the Repub-
lic as defendants and sought an injunction against continuation
of the arbitral proceedings against the Republic. The second,
initiated by PLN, sought annulment of the arbitration awards
against PLN. In the Republic's Statement of Defense submitted
the next month in the arbitration proceedings, the GOI stated:
With respect to the court actions instituted by Pertamina
against the Claimants, the Respondent and PLN in the Dis-
trict Court of CentralJakarta seeking an injunction to restrain
this arbitral reference to proceed, in the event that such in-
junction were to be granted and the Claimants should none-
theless seek to proceed with this arbitration and the Tribunal
should accede to such request, Respondent reserves the right
to apply to the Indonesian courts or other Authorities for an
order declaring contempt of court and for sequestration of
the Claimants' assets, not limited to any rights (any such are
denied) which they may have under the Awards; and for or-
ders for fines upon the Claimants and/or imprisonment.4
Further, PLN apparently submitted pleadings to the Jakarta
court stating that "PLN will take legal actions against [Mr. Job
Taylor of Latham & Watkins, lead counsel for the project compa-
nies] both privately and criminally" for comments attributed to
Mr. Taylor by an Indonesian newspaper that PLN considered to
be defamatory and insulting to the Indonesian court system.42
In late July, the Jakarta court issued an injunction halting
execution of the PLN Awards, purporting to suspend the arbitra-
tion proceedings against the Republic, and imposing a fine of
US$1 million per day against the project companies for violation
of the injunction.43
As a consequence of the Jakarta court's injunction, and fol-
lowing a ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal that the Republic was
40. Patuha-ROI Interim Award, supra note 1, at B-8.
41. Id. at B-10.
42. Id. at B-19-20.
43. Id. at B-11, B-13-14.
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responsible for Pertamina's actions in maintaining the Jakarta
litigation, in early September the Arbitral Tribunal issued an or-
der holding the Republic in default of the Terms of Appoint-
ment of the Tribunal. 4 Under the terms of that order, the Tri-
bunal also convened hearings on September 22 at the Peace Pal-
ace in The Hague, rather than Jakarta. The Arbitral Tribunal
explicitly set the hearing location without changing the legal
seat of the arbitration,45 a decision with implications for the
scope of available grounds for annulment of awards discussed
below.
The reaction of the Indonesian side included filing an ap-
plication with ICSID for removal of the Arbitral Tribunal on the
grounds that the Tribunal displayed "express bias" against the
Republic of Indonesia, acted with a "closed mind, in contempt
of an Order of the Court of competent jurisdiction of Indonesia
... in breach of natural justice," and "behaved in a manner in
which the Republic is entitled to have lost confidence in the Tri-
bunal's fairness, impartiality and respect of law." 46 Despite these
entreaties, the Secretary General of ICSID did not remove any
member of the Arbitral Tribunal.
The Republic also sought an injunction from the District
Court of The Hague preventing the scheduled arbitration hear-
ing. On the morning of September 20, however, the Dutch Dis-
trict Court denied the Republic's application to enjoin the pro-
posed hearings at the Peace Palace. 47 The coercive removal of
Professor Priyatna to Jakarta, recounted at the beginning of this
Essay, then occurred on September 21. On September 22, the
Republic failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.48 At the
hearing, the President of the Arbitral Tribunal made an oral
statement of the events surrounding Professor Priyatna's failure
to appear at the hearing and submitted for the record state-
ments of two witnesses to the airport events. Mr. de Fina read
his own statement of those events into the record.49 The Tribu-
44. Id. at B-19-20.
45. Id. at B-19.
46. Id. at B-20.
47. Id. at B-22-23.
48. Id. at B-23.
49. The text of these oral statements and written statements describe the effort to
locate Professor Priyatna when he failed to contact the other two arbitrators, the discov-
ery that his booking at the agreed hotel had been cancelled by an Indonesian embassy
official, telephone conversations with that official who denied knowledge of Professor
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nal President then advised the claimants that a decision on de-
fault by the Republic had already been fully deliberated by the
Arbitral Tribunal.5" Interim Awards signed by the two remaining
panelists were issued on September 26, 1999, granting default
awards against the Republic of Indonesia.51 Final Awards were
issued on October 16.52 In December 1999, OPIC and the
Lloyds insurance syndicates honored claims under their political
risk policies, and the project sponsor "closed the book" on
Himpurna and Patuha.53
While the project sponsor and the project lenders may have
halted enforcement activities upon receiving the proceeds of the
political risk policies, OPIC and the private insurance syndicates
of course inherited rights under the awards against PLN and the
Republic. Acting as subrogee of the claims of the project compa-
nies, OPIC demanded payment of the awards by Indonesia. Ini-
tially, the Indonesian Minister of Finance publicly rejected any
prospect of paying the awards,54 but Indonesia softened its posi-
tion under political pressure from the U.S. government. How-
ever, U.S. impatience rose as discussions between the two gov-
ernments dragged on for months, and remarks of U.S. Ambassa-
dor Robert Gelbard quoted in the press created a stir in Jakarta
that the United States was threatening to seize Indonesian assets:
"There is always the possibility of declaring expropriation . .. If
we were to do this, it would result in a dramatic deterioration of
the rupiah and would hurt Indonesia very much."55 While the
"seizure" interpretation placed on these words by critics may
seem strained to international lawyers, the uproar in Indonesia
further complicated intergovernmental discussions. According
to local press reports at year-end 2000, OPIC and the Indonesian
Priyatna's whereabouts, investigative efforts yielding information that Professor Priyatna
was booked on a September 21 flight from Amsterdam to Jakarta, and the airport meet-
ing itself. Id. at B-13-28. "The atmosphere was very frightening." See id. at B-26 (quot-
ing statement by witness to airport meeting).
50. Id. at B-24 & B-28.
51. Id.; Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Bermuda) v. Republic of Indon. (Interim
Award, Sept. 26, 1999), 15 ME.AEY'S INT'L. REP. A-I (2000) [hereinafter Himpurna-ROI
Interim Award].
52. Patuha-ROI Final Award, supra note 12; Himpurna-ROI Final Award, supra note
12.
53. Indonesia Doesn't Pay Award, supra note 29.
54. Indonesia Rejects OPIC's 290 mln USD Insurance Claims Over Power Projects, AFX-
ASIA, Mar. 8, 2000.
55. U.S. Threatens to Seize Indonesia Assets Over OPIC Dispute, AFX-AsIA, July 26, 2000.
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government agreed to settle OPIC's claim on a payment sched-
ule consistent with the Paris Club repayment schedule for Indo-
nesian sovereign debt. 6 By April 2001, however, OPIC and the
GOI had in fact not yet reached final agreement on a settle-
ment.57 There has been no public report as to the ability of the
Lloyds insurance syndicates to recover on their subrogation
claims, and no indication whether anyone will pursue recovery
of amounts due under the awards in excess of the insurance pol-
icy payments.58
As unusual as this tale might seem, the Himpurna and
Patuha projects were not the only Indonesian transactions in
which local courts have sought to enjoin international arbitra-
tion proceedings amidst the difficulties arising out of Indone-
sia's deep economic and political troubles. The most well-
known independent power project in the country, the Paiton
project, sponsored by Edison Mission Energy, Inc., Mitsui Corp.,
General Electric Corp. and others, also found itself in serious
commercial and legal difficulties as a result of disputes with
PLN.5" Hashim S. Djojohadikusumo, brother-in-law to one of
President Suharto's daughters, was a major participant in the
Paiton project, owning equity in the project company itself and
controlling the coal company holding the long-term coal supply
contract for the project.60
Unlike the CalEnergy projects, which were developed under
Indonesian regulations governing geothermal power projects,
Paiton and many other IPPs were developed under decrees ad-
dressing IPPs generally. Consistent with those decrees, PT
Paiton Energy Company was organized under Indonesian law as
the project company to develop the US$2.9 billion Paiton I
56. See OPIC and PLN Reach Agreement, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 2, 2001.
57. Telephone conversation between the author and Thomas J. Mahaffey, Assis-
tant General Council, OPIC, on February 14, 2001, and email exchange in April 2001
(on file with author).
58. As fines of US$1 million per day began accruing against the project companies
by virtue of the terms of the anti-arbitration injunction issued by the Jakarta Central
District Court in late July 1999, the Republic would most likely also be entitled under
Indonesian law to seize the rights of the project companies in the two facilities in satis-
faction of the hundreds of millions of U.S. Dollars of unpaid fines. There is no public
report as to whether Indonesia has pursued this course of action and, if so, the reaction
of the secured lenders.
59. Jakarta Court Puts an End to Paiton Lawsuit, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 21, 2000.
60. Id. The following description of the Paiton project is based on the personal
knowledge of the author, but contains only information publicly available.
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power project. The Indonesian Ministry of Finance provided a
support letter for PLN's obligations at the time of financial close
in April 1995 (which support letter became the model for the
later MoF Letters in other Indonesian IPPs). Limited-recourse
debt financing support was provided by a syndicate of commer-
cial banks, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Ex-
port-Import Bank of Japan, the Japanese Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade & Industry, OPIC, and a rated Rule 144A capital
markets bond offering. As the first large IPP in Indonesia,
Paiton became a lightning rod for critics of the private power
program.
The Asian financial crisis enveloped Indonesia close to the
same time as the Paiton project had reached the end of con-
struction work and begun to prepare for generating electricity
against payment by PLN of capacity and energy tariffs. Fueled by
Hashim's involvement, the Paiton project suffered suspicion of
involvement in corruption, collusion, and nepotism ("KKN"),61
although Paiton strongly denied these claims and offered to un-
dergo an independent audit.6 2 As a result of the impact of the
economic crisis, and employing the leverage created by the cor-
ruption allegations, PLN now sought reductions of over fifty per-
cent in the tariff, among other concessions. PLN unilaterally
limited its tariff payments to an amount based on an artificial
exchange rate of 2,450 Rupiah to the U.S. Dollar (as it did with
other IPPs) and began to refuse to accept energy from the
Paiton facility. The project sponsors sought the political assis-
tance of the U.S. and Japanese governments, who each had
about US$900 million of exposure to the project by virtue of
their financial support. Faced with stalemate, and now aware of
the consequences of delaying court action until after the issu-
61. See T.M. Callahan, US$25b Indon. PowerPlay, Bus. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1999 [herein-
after Indon. Power Play]. The author noted the following:
In PLN's book, this is just another bad Suharto-era deal that benefited cronies
and big foreign business at the expense of the people. Critics are quick to
allege corruption because two of the former strongman's family members
were involved in the project. Titiek Prabowo, one of Mr. Suharto's daughters,
and Hashim S. Djojohadikusumo, whose brother is married to Titiek, hold a
combined 15 percent stake through PT Batu Hitam Perkasa. PLN president
director Adhi Satriya has also accused Paiton in Jakarta's newspapers of cor-
rupt practices that drove up the cost of the power project.
Id.
62. T. M. Callahan, Jakarta Must Stop Judges from Corrupting the Law, Bus. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2000 [hereinafter Jakarta Must Stop].
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ance of an adverse award, PLN commenced a lawsuit in October
1999 in the Central Jakarta District Court against the project
company, notwithstanding the mandatory arbitration clause in
the Paiton-PLN power purchase agreement.63 In the Indonesian
lawsuit, PLN sought a court order voiding the power purchase
agreement, arguing that the contract was void ab initio by reason
of corruption, overcharging for power, and inconsistency with
Indonesian law.64 In a press conference, PLN President Director
Adhi Satriya was quoted in Indonesian press reports as saying
"[w] e filed the lawsuit at a local court rather than an arbitration
court, because the issue in dispute is not the terms of contracts
but the (contract awarding) process and the corruption, collu-
sion, and nepotism involved in it."6 5 Paiton then initiated arbi-
tration proceedings against PLN in Stockholm under the terms
of the arbitration clause in the power purchase agreement.66
The Jakarta court responded by issuing an injunction in late No-
vember 1999 against those arbitral proceedings, backed by the
threat of a US$600 million fine for non-compliance.67
The lawsuit and arbitration proceedings escalated the battle
with the project sponsors, over forty international banks and in-
stitutional investors and, most importantly, U.S. and Japanese
government authorities crucial to Indonesia's efforts to recover
from economic collapse. At the same time, the story of Professor
Priyatna's removal from the CalEnergy arbitration in The
Netherlands was circulating within the international community.
Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid prudently re-
sponded by ordering in December a halt to PLN's combative liti-
gation in favor of an interim settlement under which both sides
agreed to avoid adversarial proceedings and to negotiate towards
a long-term solution.68 PLN's President Director and its Direc-
tor of Planning both promptly resigned in protest against the
change in approach required by President Wahid.69 That in-
63. Indonesian Power Co. Moves to Cancel Contract, ASIA PULSE, Oct. 8, 1990.
64. EDISON INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K, at 29-30 (Dec. 31, 1999).
65. Id.
66. Indon. Power Play, supra note 61; see also EDISON INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON
FORM 10-K, supra note 64, at 30.
67. Jakarta Must Stop, supra note 62.
68. Id.
69. See Senior Execs of Indonesia's PLN Resign, ASIA PULSE, Dec. 21, 1999.
PROJECT FINANCE & ARBITRATION
terim settlement remains in place, but a final resolution of the
dispute has yet to be agreed upon.
A third Indonesian IPP is also known to have initiated inter-
national arbitration proceedings, the US$380 million Karaha
Bodas project sponsored by Florida Power and Light Co. The
Karaha Bodas project was "postponed" by the Indonesian gov-
ernment by decree in early 1998, and Karaha Bodas promptly
commenced arbitration proceedings against PLN, Pertamina,
and the Republic. Although the arbitration is confidential, the
Indonesian press reported in March 2000 that the case against
the Republic had been dismissed on procedural grounds.7" Un-
like the CalEnergy and Paiton projects, none of the Indonesian
State entities has sought local court involvement in the Karaha
Bodas arbitration.
Court interference in international arbitration has re-
mained a difficult issue as well for other non-project transactions
in Indonesia in the aftermath of the financial crisis. According
to press reports,7 ' in a case brought in South Jakarta District
Court by PT Perusahaan Dagang Tempo over a pharmaceuticals
distributorship dispute with foreign-controlled PT Roche Indo-
nesia ("Roche Indonesia"), the local Court ignored mandatory
domestic arbitration provisions in the underlying contract and
ordered sequestration of Roche Indonesia's assets, including
land, factory, and inventories. Even more surprisingly, this or-
der came before Roche Indonesia had an opportunity to defend
itself at the court hearing. The Court later ordered Roche Indo-
nesia to pay Rp 281 billion (approximately US$33 million) in
damages for breach of contract. Roche Indonesia has appealed
the decision, but has also stated that it will not pay the damage
award "under any circumstances."72
Refusal to honor mandatory arbitration agreements was also
a theme in Indonesian financial derivatives transactions during
this period. In the U.K. case of Bankers Trust Co. v. PTJakarta
International Hotels & Development,"3 the Commercial Court is-
70. R1 Wins, supra note 27.
71. See, e.g., Jakarta Must Stop, supra note 62.
72. "I wish to state categorically that Roche Indonesia will not be paying Rp 281
billion under any circumstances, and we believe that we will be successful with our ap-
peal." See Letter from Dieter Garbade, President Director, PT Roche Indonesia, to The
Jakarta Post, reprinted in JAKARTA POST, June 23, 2000.
73. 1 Lloyd's Rep. 910 (Q.B. 1999).
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sued an injunction in December 1999 at the request of Bankers
Trust restraining court proceedings in the Central Jakarta Dis-
trict Court brought by its Indonesian counterparty over a num-
ber of currency swap agreements between the two parties. The
swaps had been documented under an ISDA Master Agreement
containing a clause submitting disputes to arbitration before the
London Court of International Arbitration. A similar injunction
was issued by the Commercial Court in an unreported January
1999 case entitled Bankers Trust Co. v. PTMayora Indah.7 4 Earlier
proceedings in the Jakarta court had included an unsuccessful
motion by Bankers Trust for replacement of the presiding judge
on grounds of bias and claims by Bankers Trust that JIHD had
forged evidence by presenting the ISDA Master Agreement to
the court with the schedule containing the arbitration clause re-
moved.75
Before turning to the Pakistani example, several points
about the Indonesian experience are worth addressing. First
and most importantly, the crisis circumstances and corruption
allegations surrounding large Indonesian infrastructure projects
undoubtedly offer a significant explanation of the motives of the
Indonesian parties in seeking court interference with arbitral
proceedings. PLN found itself unable to honor large U.S. Dollar
tariff obligations to a large number of projects as a result of the
steep drop in the exchange value of the Rupiah and the general
drop in demand for electricity resulting from the severe contrac-
tion of the Indonesian economy. While the Republic of Indone-
sia had access to foreign exchange reserves unavailable to PLN,
the Republic was itself suffering a general foreign exchange and
economic crisis requiring strict rationing of those vastly
shrunken reserves. Legal arguments of changes in circum-
stances, impossibility of performance, hardship, and force
majeure were unlikely to offer the Indonesian obligors an excuse
from their payment obligations, as the energy project documents
all contained very detailed force majeure and other provisions
allocating the risks of foreign exchange fluctuations, change in
law and payment defaults to the Indonesian side.7 6 As the Final
74. Mark Kantor, OTC Derivatives and Arbitration: Should Counterparties Embrace the
Alternative? 117 BANKING L.J. 408, 414 (2000).
75. See Court Rejects Bankers Trust's Request for Judge Replacement, JAKARTA POST, July
16, 1999, Bankers Trust AccusesJIHD of Forging Evidence, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 11, 1999.
76. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-26-31.
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Awards against PLN demonstrate, international tribunals regu-
larly give effect to intentional contractual allocations of risk in
preference to statutory or customary force majeure principles."7
Blocking arbitration, therefore, became an important objection,
particularly once the awards against PLN brought home to the
Indonesian government the weakness of its legal position.
The impact of de facto national insolvency was exacerbated
by a widely-held belief among Indonesians that the IPP contracts
were overpriced and obtained through corrupt means. Average
tariffs of roughly 6.50 U.S. cents/KwH for Indonesian IPPs com-
pared poorly with, for example, a weighted levelized tariff
agreed to in late 1998 for a Bangladeshi IPP of 2.73 U.S. cents/
KwH.78 Many Indonesians pointed to KKN as the explanation
for this difference. Those concerns were compounded by disclo-
sure of favorable arrangements for Suharto family members,
such as the alleged deal in which the Paiton sponsors, among
others, lent Hashim Djojohadikusumo's investment vehicle PT
Batu Hitam Perkasa the money to purchase its fifteen percent
shareholding in the Paiton project company, under terms
whereby the loan was only to be repaid out of profits from the
project company.7 9
77. Id. at B-30-33. The right of parties to agree to allocate risks in a manner con-
trary to the result that might otherwise obtain under legal law doctrines excusing con-
tract performance is recognized in such widely diverse sources of law as Articles 6 and
79 of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Articles 6.2.1
and 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, and
Sections 2-102(3) and 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, Fed. Reg.
6262 (1987) 15 U.S.C.A. app at 29 (West Supp. 1989), reprinted in 3 I.L.M. 668 (1980);
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (1994), reprinted in M.J. BONELL, AN INTERNA-
TIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CoNTACrT LAW 14 (1994).
78. Bangladesh Signs Power Purchase Deal with AES, ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNEC-
TIONS, Co. NEWS, E & SE AsIA No. 25, Oct. 27, 1998, available at http://www.gasandoil.
com/goc/company/cns84432.htm (noting that Bangladesh Power Development Board
and AES Transpower Private Ltd. executed 22-year power purchase agreement for 360
MW gas-fired US$200 million power project on build-own-operate basis).
79. See Pete Engardio & Michael Shari, The Suharto Empire, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 19,
1996, at 46:
Batu Hitam owns 15% of the plant but didn't put in its own capital. Instead,
its share of the equity in Paiton is a loan to be repaid from profits. 'In Indone-
sia, how the practice usually works is you lend the Indonesians their equity,'
says an investor close to the deal. 'That of course raises the cost.' GE and
Edison officials say they are small participants and the financing is above-
board.
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The KKN allegations created a potent motive for disregard-
ing the arbitration provisions found in contracts allegedly ob-
tained by defrauding the Indonesian government. It is impossi-
ble to quarrel with claims that Suharto family members and "cro-
nies" systematically manipulated Indonesian public contracts to
their extraordinary financial advantage, and with great ultimate
harm to the ordinary citizens of the country. Transparency In-
ternational has routinely listed Indonesia as one of the most cor-
ruption-ridden countries in the world, and at least fourteen of
the twenty-seven IPPs have been linked to cronies or Suharto rel-
atives in the Indonesian press.8 0 To the general population of
Indonesia, it seems impossible to explain that contracts obtained
through corruption must be enforced in accordance with their
terms.
81
The undoubted existence of pervasive KKN misconduct in
Indonesian contracts does not, however, explain all of the anti-
arbitration injunctions emanating from Indonesian courts. No
KKN allegations were reported, for example, in the disputes in
the Roche Indonesia case or over the Bankers Trust currency
swaps in PT Jakarta International Hotels or PT Mayor Indah. In-
stead, the pharmaceuticals distribution and derivatives cases ap-
Id. Apart from allegations of overcharging and corruption, the size of the tariffs in
Indonesian IPPs can be explained by other factors as well, including the risk premium
necessary to attract investors to finance first-of-a-kind transactions in a State with a
checkered economic and political history, the higher cost of coal-fired power plants as
compared with gas-fired turbines, and the impact of several years of subsequent compe-
tition between 1994 (the date of the first Indonesian contracts) and October 1998 (the
date of the illustrative Bangladeshi contract) on the costs of international power project
construction contracts and financing fees. Moreover, in the most high-profile project,
the Paiton transaction, critics of the cost of that project neglect to mention that 0.75
U.S. cents/KwH of that cost was attributable to the expense of building roads, sea water
intakes and a switchyard to be shared with neighboring power units, all as required by
the Indonesian side. See Press Release on Paiton Project, Oct. 7, 1999, reprinted in EDISON
INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON FORM 8-K, (Oct. 20, 1999). The Paiton sponsors have con-
sistently maintained that, after backing out the expense of the additional facilities re-
quired by Indonesia, the project's tariffs were fully competitive with similar path-break-
ing projects in emerging markets. Id. Still, important questions about the participation
of Suharto family and cronies in IPPs remained unanswered and the allegations of
overcharging and corruption fuelled powerful currents within Indonesian society.
80. See, e.g., The Future of Independent Power Producers, INDONESIAN COM. NEWSL.,
Dec. 19, 2000.
81. The arbitrability of claims of corrupt inducement of contracts arises in U.S.
disputes as well as disputes in lesser-developed countries. Some U.S. courts have re-
quired prior judicial review of analogous claims rather than permitting arbitrations to
proceed. See WILLIAM H. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION, 107-08 n.460 (1995).
PROJECT FINANCE & ARBITRATION
pear to illustrate a visceral rejection by several Indonesian courts
of international arbitration as an acceptable method of dispute
resolution. Of even more concern, the issue of corruption is
not, unfortunately, limited solely to KKN claims involving inter-
national investments in Indonesia. Serious questions also exist
regarding corruption and unreliability of the Indonesian court
system. Thus, the U.S. government has criticized the unreliabil-
ity of Indonesian justice in decidedly undiplomatic words:
The court system does not provide effective recourse for solv-
ing commercial disputes. The judiciary is nominally indepen-
dent, but irregular payments and other collusive practices
often influence judicial outcomes.8 2
Investors in Indonesia had no confidence in the impartiality
or reliability of the Indonesian system ofjustice. Those concerns
have been at the heart of the demands for mandatory submis-
sion to international arbitration made uniformly in project nego-
tiations by international investors, lenders, and export credit
agencies. Such problems also provide the energy behind unsub-
stantiated rumors that local courts were suborned or biased in
many of the IPP and other disputes discussed above.
The last significant element of the Indonesian situation to
be noted is the upheaval in political authority. For well over
forty years, Indonesian President Suharto led a stable authorita-
rian government, backed by the support of the Indonesian mili-
tary and many prominent business families. The Asian financial
collapses, however, proved a shockwave too powerful for the
Suharto regime to survive, triggering the strongman's resigna-
tion and a crisis of political succession, ethnic and religious divi-
sion, and potential breakup of the Indonesian State that contin-
ues to reverberate today. The ensuing turmoil has created politi-
cal vacuums and conflict. Coupled with the strength of the KKN
allegations and the weakness of government institutions in the
post-Suharto era, these circumstances have resulted in an oppor-
tunity for lower and mid-level actors to exercise unusual inde-
82. Indonesia: Investment Climate Statement 2000, Embassy of the United States of
America, Jakarta, Indonesia, at A.4, available at http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/
econ/investment2000-2.html. Similar allegations have been made about Pakistani
courts. See infta notes 103, 163. As Professor Park of Boston University observes, an
important practical element of negotiating arbitration clauses "involves choosing an
arbitral situs where annulment of awards is not likely to be facilitated by a bribe to a
legal judge." PARK, supra note 81, at 76.
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pendence and autonomy. For example, Ministry and parliamen-
tary figures were said to be reluctant to intervene into PLN's Oc-
tober 1998 decision to commence litigation against Paiton by
reason of the volatile KKN claims.8" That autonomy was em-
ployed by PLN in a fashion that clashed spectacularly with other
foreign economic and security interests of Indonesia.
What is perhaps most extraordinary about the Paiton dis-
pute is the confrontation that Jakarta was willing to risk with
some of its biggest supporters.
On top of being owned by powerful multinationals such
as Mission Energy, Mitsui & Company and General Electric,
most of the financing for Paiton's U.S. $2.5 billion power
plant in East Java came from the U.S. and Japanese govern-
ments. The project was put together with the direct involve-
ment of the U.S. Exim Bank,Japan Exim Bank,Japanese Min-
istry of Trade and OPIC.
According, to a newspaper report, Washington has over
$800 million invested in the venture. That Jakarta was even
willing to play this high-stakes game with such important
friends is worrying. 84
The competing argument, of course, is that bribery investi-
gations belong in the courts rather than private, confidential ar-
bitration tribunals and that the role of important foreign govern-
ments and multinationals in the disputed transaction reinforces
the need for a transparent and publicly accountable forum. The
strength of that argument, however, has been undermined by
the erratic course of justice in Indonesia's courts.
These Indonesian difficulties could be dismissed as sui
generis to the sad problems of that country were it not for the
equally high-profile dispute between HubCo and Pakistan over
that country's largest power project.85 Although efforts to de-
83. "Frustrated by PLN's intransigence, Paiton has even asked the Indonesian gov-
ernment to become more directly involved in negotiations for its power purchase agree-
ment with the state power utility. However, this appeal has fallen on deaf ears primarily
because the issue is such a hot potato in Jakarta." Indon. Power Play, supra note 61.
84. Jakarta Must Stop, supra note 62.
85. Details of this transaction are taken from The Hub Power Company Limited
Offering Memorandum dated October 5, 1994, with respect to an offer of up to
16,183,380 Global Depositary Receipts representing 404,584,500 new Ordinary Shares
of Rupees 10 each at a price of US$10.825 per Global Depositary Receipt (as part of an
overall issue of up to 26,529,800 Global Depositary Receipts), filed with the Luxem-
bourg and Karachi Stock Exchanges and the Registrar of Companies, Islamabad, Paki-
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velop a private power project by one or more of HubCo's spon-
sors can be traced back to 1985, serious planning for the HubCo
project began with a feasibility study in 1988. In August 1992,
HubCo entered into a power purchase agreement with WAPDA
providing for HubCo to develop a 1,292 MW power plant and
sell the resulting power to WAPDA. The WAPDA power
purchase agreement provided that, once the facility was success-
fully built, WAPDA would pay a monthly tariff in U.S. Dollars for
both capacity and energy utilized. HubCo also entered into an
Implementation Agreement and a Guarantee Agreement with
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan ("GOP") under which the GOP
guaranteed the obligations of WAPDA as power purchaser, the
government-owned fuel supplier and the State Bank of Pakistan.
The project was initially sponsored by National Power PLC
of the United Kingdom and Xenel Industries Limited of Saudia
Arabia. Entergy Corp of the United States later became a signifi-
cant HubCo shareholder as well. In addition to the sharehold-
ings of its sponsors and promoters, HubCo made a rights offer-
ing for ordinary shares, listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange,
and an international global depository share receipts offering,
listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. Together, the pub-
lic shareholders in the domestic and international share offer-
ings comprised approximately thirty-five percent of total share-
holdings. Unlike the various Indonesian project companies,
therefore, HubCo was a public company with significant num-
bers of public shareholders, many of them Pakistanis. As will be-
come apparent, though, the implicit political risk protection af-
forded by widely distributed shareholdings inside and outside
Pakistan proved unreliable.
In addition to the equity, the total project cost of approxi-
mately US$1.6 billion for the HubCo project was financed from
a variety of lending sources. Subordinated debt of over US$425
million was provided by a GOP-controlled fund out of back-to-
back loans made by the World Bank and the governments of
Japan, France, Italy, and the United States and guaranteed by
Pakistan. Senior debt of about US$712 million for the project
company was funded by various commercial bank syndicates, the
Commonwealth Development Corporation (an arm of the U.K.
stan, and from the author's personal knowledge (and include only information publicly
available).
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government), and local Pakistani banks. The international bank
syndicates received partial guarantees and insurance policies
from the World Bank and Italian, Japanese, and French export
credit agencies. The partial guarantees issued by the World
Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Japan were in turn
counter-indemnified by the GOP. Like the implicit political risk
protection sought through the public share offerings, the im-
plicit political risk protection afforded by the participation of the
World Bank and the export credit agencies in the project, and
the financial stake created by the GOP guarantee and counter-
indemnitee, unfortunately also proved unreliable at the moment
of need.
The Hub project represented an important precedent for
the World Bank. The Bank had been heavily involved in the de-
velopment of the Pakistani energy policy, starting in the mid-
1980s. When Ms. Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister for a
second time in 1993, Pakistan's energy policy continued in coop-
eration with World Bank authorities but with several alterations
that later generated noticeable controversy. In all, nineteen
IPPs began construction during the Bhutto era, with estimated
project costs of about US$4.6 billion. Following Ms. Bhutto's re-
turn to power, amendments to the HubCo project documents
were executed increasing the amount of equity in the project
company from twenty percent of project costs to twenty-five per-
cent of project costs and increasing total project cost by about
US$340 million.8 6 The HubCo project financing closed in the
fall of 1994, and construction moved forward steadily. The
power plant was commissioned and began selling power to
WAPDA in March 1997.
It may be expected for such a large and unprecedented in-
vestment in a country with such a troubled history as Pakistan
that the governing law and dispute resolution provisions of the
project documents were investor-friendly. The parties included
provisions in Clause 15 of the WAPD power purchase agreement
selecting English law as the governing law and agreeing to sub-
mit "any dispute or difference of any kind whatsoever .. .be-
tween WAPDA and the company in connection with or arising
out of this Agreement" to final settlement by mandatory arbitra-
86. Hill, supra note 4.
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tion. 7 The dispute resolution provisions specified that, if at the
time of dispute the GOP had implemented the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States8" ("ICSID Convention"), then the dispute
would be submitted to arbitration administered by ICSID.8 9
Those provisions further stated that HubCo would be deemed to
be a "foreign-controlled company" for purposes of the ICSID
Convention, thus satisfying ICSID's jurisdictional require-
ments,90 so long as not less than thirty percent of the shares of
HubCo were held by foreign investors. If ICSID arbitration was
unavailable at the time of a dispute, then the proceedings would
be conducted in London under the arbitration rules of the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). 9
The original power purchase agreement was executed be-
tween WAPDA and HubCo in 1992, at a time when Mr. Nawaz
Sharif was Prime Minister of Pakistan. The initial controversial
modification to the WAPDA power purchase agreement, the
Supplementary Deed, was negotiated during Mr. Sharif's admin-
istration and executed on the first day of Ms. Benazir Bhutto's
administration in 1993. Two additional modifications, the First
Amendment and Second Amendment, were negotiated and en-
tered into under the Bhutto government in 1994.
Politics, economics, and corruption allegations began to
move towards center stage in 1996. ByJune 1996, Transparency
International was naming Pakistan as second only to Nigeria in
its corruption rankings and, in late 1996, Ms. Bhutto was dis-
missed as Prime Minister for a number of reasons, including
claims of corruption and nepotism. Ms. Bhutto's husband, Asif
Zadari, was convicted of corruption and imprisoned in Pakistan.
Ms. Bhutto herself fled the country and was convicted in absen-
tia. Both Mr. Zadari and Ms. Bhutto continue to strongly assert
their innocence of these charges. In February 1997, Mr. Nawaz
87. See HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 444 (quoting Clause 15.2 of WAPDA
power purchase agreement).
88. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
89. See HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 444 (quoting Clause 15.4 of WAPDA
power purchase agreement). Pakistan has still not implemented the ICSID Conven-
tion.
90. See ICSID Convention art. 25(2) (b).
91. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 444 (quoting Clause 15.4(c) of WAPDA
power purchase agreement).
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Sharif again was elected as Prime Minister. Ironically, by the
time of the final hearings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan
discussed below, Mr. Sharif himself had been overthrown by a
largely bloodless military coup led by Army Chief of Staff Gen-
eral Pervez Musharraf.9
2
Economic problems multiplied in the country and observers
began to conclude that Pakistan had overestimated its need for
power and underestimated its ability to pay for that power.9 Be-
set by political and economic pressures, the IPP projects, includ-
ing HubCo, came under intense scrutiny for possible improper
payments and preferences. Compounding these problems, the
financial fortunes of WAPDA, never strong to begin with, deteri-
orated substantially. The foreign exchange pressure of U.S. Dol-
lar-denominated power tariffs on the weakened State utility in-
creased as growth rates stalled and the Pakistani Rupee lost value
against the U.S. Dollar.
Soon after Mr. Sharif's return to power, the Pakistani Gov-
ernment began to pressure the IPPs by refusing to cooperate in
commissioning the plants, imposing a variety of unanticipated
taxes and charges, delaying needed permits, and slowing fuel de-
liveries. Matters came to a head in early 1998, as the economic
impact of the Asian financial crisis confronted Pakistan with ad-
ditional unsought problems. In May, the Minister of Water and
Power claimed "irrefutable proof' that IPP sponsors had paid
bribes. Soon thereafter, seven power projects, including HubCo,
received preliminary Notices of Intent to Terminate ("NIT")
their power purchase agreements. 94 Each "NIT" (as these no-
tices quickly became known in the international project commu-
nity) contained identically worded charges of "kickbacks, over-
invoicing and unlawful commissions" and "failure to maintain
correct accounts and violations of the laws of Pakistan" but no
details to support these assertions. 95 Indeed, at no time through-
out the Pakistani IPP crisis did the GOP release credible details
of any of these corruption allegations, and each of the targeted
project companies has denied the allegations and instead
92. See Nudrat B. Majeed, Commentary on the HubCoJudgment, 16 INT'L ARB. 431,
433 (2000)
93. See Hill, supra note 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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claimed that the accusations were intended to intimidate the
IPPs into reducing tariffs.
Although not directly part of this story, but crucial to under-
standing the international and fiscal environment in which the
HubCo and Pakistani IPP crisis played out, in May 1998 India
exploded nuclear devices and Pakistan responded with its own
nuclear tests. These tests triggered mandatory U.S. sanctions, in-
cluding an obligation on the part of the U.S. Government to
seek to block "by voice and vote" most IMF, World Bank, and
Asian Development Bank assistance to the testing countries. To
the surprise of many, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and
Japan joined in blocking assistance from these multilateral insti-
tutions and limiting their own financial aid as a means of exert-
ing leverage over Pakistan and India on non-proliferation issues.
Since about forty percent of Pakistan's state budget is funded by
official aid from multilateral and government sources, the result-
ing dramatic slowdown in multilateral funding produced an
acute foreign exchange crisis for Pakistan. Although the West-
ern countries and Japan began to loosen restrictions when the
potential for total Pakistani collapse became apparent, the coun-
try remained on a very short leash regarding access to assistance
from multilateral financial institutions. Tensions between Paki-
stan and India remained high and, in May through July 1999,
Islamic mujahadeen supported by Pakistani forces fought Indian
troops in the Kargil incursion, leading Pakistan and India to the
brink of war.
Once the GOP decided on a policy of pressuring the IPPs,
HubCo came in for particularly egregious attentions.9 6 For a pe-
riod of five days in May 1998, British executives of HubCo were
confined to the power plant as de facto prisoners while armed
police surrounded the facility and conducted a site search. The
executives were released only after the British High Commis-
sioner to Pakistan visited the site and protested the siege. Then,
a number of HubCo executives were called in by the Ehtesab
(the Accountability Bureau charged with investigating corrup-
tion). Others complained of armed men outside their houses at
night. The Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), a British expatri-
ate, fled Pakistan along with several other senior HubCo offi-
cials. In October 1998, the Pakistani Federal Investigation
96. Id.
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Agency ("FIA") raided HubCo's corporate offices seeking evi-
dence of corruption. The FIA took custody of HubCo corporate
records and sought to arrest the new HubCo CEO, S. Khursaid
Husain. The new CEO had been tipped off to the possible arrest
and hid out for several days until "bail before arrest" was granted
by the Sindh High Court.
9 7
In parallel to these "on the ground" events, HubCo found
itself in a number of litigation controversies. In May 1998, a con-
sumer petitioned the Lahore High Court for relief, claiming that
his power bill was too high because of corruption in negotiations
over the HubCo power purchase agreement. The Lahore court
issued a temporary order barring HubCo from making foreign
remittances for payment of debt, dividends, or otherwise and re-
duced the monthly tariff rate from 7.2 cents to about 3.3 cents.
Press reports captured the inattention to legal niceties by the
Pakistani High Court: "Both orders were made to prevent un-
due harm to Pakistani consumers, said the court, which did not
reach any findings on the corruption charges."98 On appeal to
the Supreme Court of Pakistan, HubCo obtained partial relief
from these orders-the company would be permitted to transfer
foreign exchange outside Pakistan to pay its external debt but
could not make dividends or other distributions to its foreign
investors. The Pakistani Supreme Court also adjusted the tariff
order of the Lahore High Court, moving it up to about 5.3 cents
97. Id. "Bail before Arrest" is a Pakistani procedure whereby the target of a crimi-
nal investigation can obtain an order of bail from a local court in advance of actually
being arrested by the local authorities. This device is a novel notion that could develop
a following in the United States with proper marketing. In a press interview, Husain
showed a reporter a bail warrant alleging that in 1993 and 1994 Husain had employed
fraud and corruption to procure HubCo's power purchase agreement. Husain dryly
noted to the reporter that until 1995 he had worked at an investment firm in London,
which had no dealings with either HubCo or its principal sponsor. Id.
98. Id. This litigation before the Lahore High Court, of course, did not implicate
the mandatory arbitration provisions of the project documents, as it was brought by an
outsider to the contract pursuant to broad "public interest" jurisdiction of the Pakistani
courts. Similar limitations on the protection afforded to investors by arbitration clauses
became apparent in at least twenty separate lawsuits brought in India against the Enron-
sponsored Dabhol Power project by labor representatives, politicians, community activ-
ists, environmental groups, and other opponents of that project. Like Pakistan, Indian
law provides for "public interest" litigation. All of these cases were ultimately dismissed
by the Bombay High Court or the Supreme Court of India, but only after two and a half
years of continuing litigation. See ABHAY MEHTA, POWER PLAY: A STUDY OF THE ENRON
PROJECT, 117-20, 160-75 (2000). Abhay Mehta was one of the opponents of the Dabhol
project and a plaintiff in the last lawsuit dismissed by the Indian courts.
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per kilowatt hour (roughly sixty percent of the contract rate)
while the lower court proceedings continued.9 9 All of these or-
ders, of course, were inconsistent with the negotiated terms of
the WAPDA power purchase agreement and made without de-
tailed scrutiny of the corruption allegations.
In July 1998, HubCo invoked the arbitration clause of the
WAPDA power purchase agreement and commenced ICC arbi-
tration in London. In October of that same year, WAPDA in-
formed HubCo that, after conducting an examination of the
events leading to the execution of the three Bhutto-era amend-
ments to the power purchase agreement, WAPDA had deter-
mined that the amendments "were illegal, fraudulent, collusive,
without consideration, malafide and designed to cause wrongful
loss to WAPDA and the GOP with consequential wrongful gain
to HubCo as these documents were the result of criminal con-
spiracy," and thus void ab initio and of no legal effect with re-
gard to the rights and obligations of the parties under the power
purchase agreement. 00 Citing ambiguous language of the Su-
preme Court ruling, WAPDA unilaterally reduced its tariff pay-
ments to about 3.6 cents per KhW in November 1998 and de-
manded the refunding of Rp 16 billion as an overpayment, with
eighteen percent interest.1° 1 HubCo commenced suit immedi-
ately in the Sindh High Court, seeking an injunction restraining
WAPDA from giving effect to these steps and from seeking reso-
lution of the dispute in any forum other than ICC arbitration.
The Sindh High Court issued an interim injunction preventing
WAPDA from implementing its asserted determinations, but that
order was ultimately not continued.'0 2 In January 1999, WAPDA
proceeded into Lahore High Court, arguing that the three
amendments were unlawful and void and seeking an injunction
against continuation by HubCo of the ICC arbitration proceed-
ings. After a prompt hearing, the Lahore court granted the re-
99. See Hill, supra note 4. The actual history of litigation involving the HubCo
project, of which the text is a mere summary, is highly complicated. See HubCo v.
WAPDA, supra note 2, at 441-43, 446-47.
100. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 441.
101. Hill, supra note 4; HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 441-42.
102. Peter Cornell & Arven Handley, Himpurna and Hub: International Arbitration
in Developing Countries, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L. ARB. REP. 39, 41 (2000). The authors of this
article practice with the law firm that represented HubCo in the ICC arbitration pro-
ceedings.
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quested anti-arbitration injunction.' ° In late January 1999, the
Sindh High Court issued an order requiring the parties to ig-
nore the injunction granted by the Lahore High Court. After a
103. Id. The HubCo dispute is not the only IPP transaction in which the Lahore
High Court has failed to implement a mandatory arbitration provision. See U.S. Judge
Stays $1.4 Billion Default Against Westinghouse, 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REp. 7 (1999). In
WAK Orient Power & Light Ltd. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. MC-
99-92), Transcript of Hearing reprinted in 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. F-1 (1999) [here-
inafter Transcript of Hearing], the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania temporarily restrained WAK Orient Power & Light Ltd. from registering or
seeking to enforce a sixty billion Rupee (over US$1 billion) default judgment obtained
against Westinghouse and Raytheon entities. In 1995, WAK entered into a power
purchase agreement with Karachi Electric Supply Corp. ("KESC"), the Karachi electric-
ity utility, covering 450 MW of barge-mounted power plants at Port Qasim, Pakistan.
WAK then entered into an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract
("EPC Contract") with Westinghouse and Raytheon, pursuant to which the two contrac-
tors undertook to construct the power facility. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, at 3-4, reprinted in 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
F-13-14 (1999). The EPC Contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause providing
for ICC arbitration in London. Id. at 4-5, F-14-15. Westinghouse apparently also en-
tered into a further agreement regarding construction financing for the project. In
addition, Westinghouse allegedly caused a US$11.5 million letter of credit to be issued
in favor of WAK to support its contractual obligations. See Transcript of Hearing, supra
at F-5. The proposed project failed to proceed, as WAK was unable to obtain construc-
tion financing. Westinghouse and Raytheon thereafter commenced arbitration pro-
ceedings under the EPC Contract. In turn, WAK began a court proceeding before the
Lahore High Court, which rendered a sixty billion Rupee default judgment against the
EPC contractors. The matter came before a U.S. District Court when WAK sought to
enforce the defaultjudgment in Pennsylvania. The U.S. Court enjoined recognition or
enforcement of the Pakistani default judgment, pending further proceedings in Paki-
stan where Westinghouse had by now lodged an appeal against the default judgment.
Id. at F-1 1-12. WAK's attorneys argued before the District Court that the Pakistani court
proceedings related to the alleged construction financing commitment provided by
Westinghouse, rather than the EPC Contract. Thus, according to WAK, the Pakistani
litigation fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause in the EPC Contract. Westing-
house disagreed with this analysis of the contractual arrangements and court claims,
and the U.S. District Court sided with Westinghouse pending further information about
the litigation in Pakistan. Counsel for Westinghouse also raised during the hearing the
prospect of judicial corruption in obtaining the Pakistani default judgment:
The judge, after six or eight months, without notice to us, entered a default
judgment for over a billion dollars. We have prepared and filed an appeal of
that judgment, which is clearly erroneous and improper.
A week before thatjudgment was entered in meetings that our clients had with
the WAK principals, they said, if you don't give us the money we're entitled to,
we're going to go get that judgment and we can get it any time we want -
we're going to go get ajudgment. And that's a declaration that's been put in
the state proceeding [a proceeding in Pennsylvania state court by WAK to levy
on property of CBS Corporation, as successor to Westinghouse], attesting to
the implications of corruption associated with that allegation.
Id. at F-4.
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variety of further applications and rulings, however, by February
both the Sindh and Lahore High Courts had issued parallel or-
ders restraining HubCo from pursuing arbitration. HubCo, hav-
ing issued its own preliminary notices of intent to terminate the
WAPDA power purchase agreement, petitioned the Supreme
Court of Pakistan to review the Lahore and Sindh orders.1 °4 The
Supreme Court delivered its decision in June 2000.10'
A casual reader of the HubCo judgments issued by the Su-
preme Court of Pakistan could be forgiven for believing initially
that HubCo had been successful in overturning the anti-arbitra-
tion injunction. The first judgment, by Acting Chief Justice
Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, covering forty-four pages in the
original, 106 is a detailed discussion of the case history, facts, and
law applicable to the dispute. The judgment concludes that the
HubCo-WAPDA arbitration agreement itself was freely entered
into and valid regardless of allegations of corruption surround-
ing subsequent amendments. 10 7 Moreover, the Acting ChiefJus-
tice noted that the proper law of the arbitration agreement was
English law, the chosen law of the parties. 1°8 Taking into ac-
count the doctrine accepted under both English and Pakistani
law of separability of an arbitration clause from the remainder of
an allegedly invalid contract,0 9 the Acting Chief Justice con-
cluded that the allegations of invalidity of the WAPDA power
purchase agreement were properly referred to ICC arbitration,
and the Lahore court injunction should be lifted. 110
Only after finishing with the document, and reading at the
bottom of the original the stamped words "NOT APPROVED
FOR REPORTING," does it become apparent that the first docu-
ment is only the minority judgment. In the following six-page
104. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 442.
105. See Majeed, supra note 92.
106. Cornell & Handley, supra note 102, at 41 n.100. A copy of the original judg-
ment is available from the author upon request.
107. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 453.
108. Id. at 455-56.
109. Id. at 451-53.
110. "It would thus be seen that allegations of invalidity even serious allegations of
its being ab initio void are perfectly capable of being referred to arbitration." Id. at 451.
"The ultimate analysis, therefore, is that [the appeal by WAPDA] is declared to have
been rendered infructuous at the moment... [The appeal by HubCo] is accepted and
the impugned order ... of the High Court of Sindh ... and lift and recall the injunc-
tion preventing from proceeding with arbitration in ICC Arbitration Case No. 10045/
OLG." Id. at 456.
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majority judgment, by Justice Sh. Riaz Ahmad, the three-judge
majority concluded that the anti-arbitration injunctions should
be continued on public policy grounds.111 The bulk of the short
judgment is devoted to a recitation of WAPDA's allegations of
corruptions, 1 2 as to which no findings of fact were of course
ever made by the lower courts. The majority judgment fails to
cite or to consider any doctrines of law or case law, including any
of the Pakistani precedents discussed at length in the minority
judgment."' To the extent a rationale for upholding the injunc-
111. "Since these circumstances have been dealt with by our learned brother
Muhammad BashirJehangiriJ in his proposed judgment, we need not repeat the same
but the following salient features and circumstances noted by us have persuaded us to
hold that these prima facie furnish evidence in support of the allegations made in re-
spect of the disputed documents that the dispute is not arbitral as such should be de-
cided by a Court of law as a matter of public policy." Id. at 457. The majorityjudgment
further took note of several additional circumstances: (a) the absence of a revised
schedule to the newly executed Supplemental Deed notwithstanding a reference to that
schedule within the deed, (b) that certain portions of a schedule "were not signed by
WAPDA but by Chief Economist of WAPDA," (c) that officers of WAPDA "left the ser-
vice of WAPDA conveniently, one of whom was paid the huge amount of security which
he provided at the time ofjoining service and joined the service of HUBCO at an exu-
berant salary, which fact during arguments was not denied by the learned counsel for
HUBCO," and (d) that the modifications to the WAPDA power purchase agreement
had provided for ownership of the power facilities to vest in HubCo rather than
WAPDA at the end of the 30-year operating period of the agreement and "the amount
of CPP [the fixed component of the tariff] payable for available capacity and rates of
tariff had been allegedly unreasonably raised without any plausible reasons." Id.
112. The opinion of Justice Riaz Ahmad summarizes allegations by WAPDA as to
(i) the "one sided benefit to HUBCO" of the increase in total project costs, (ii) the
alteration of the debt-to-equity ratio from 80/20 to 75/25 which "allegedly burdened
the WAPDA and gave undue advantage to HUBCO," (iii) the implementation of these
modifications by amendments to the WAPDA power purchase agreement rather than
being referred to experts as the WAPDA power purchase agreement specified for tech-
nical disputes, and (iv) the overruling of WAPDA's opposition to these changes by the
Government after October 1993 elections restored Ms. Bhutto to power, "and it is not
clear from the record how these hotly contested matters, for such a long time, were
brought to an end suddenly and further for what considerations supplementary deed
first amendment and second amendment were abruptly executed and so on whose be-
hest and for what consideration." Id. at 458. The opinion also noted that the requests
for criminal proceedings filed by WAPDA named specific newly installed senior officials
at the Ministry of Power. Id. The majority then concluded that "[t]hese circumstances
prima facie do establish the case of misuse of power by public functionary for extrane-
ous considerations requiring detailed examination and decision by a Court of law after
full-fledged trial." Id.
113. Compare the absence of any references whatsoever to Pakistani or English
case law in the majority judgment with the extensive discussion in the minority judg-
ment of English and Pakistani precedents on "separability" of an arbitration clause
from other portions of an allegedly void agreement. See id. at 541-43 (discussing in
minority opinion six Pakistani post-Independence precedents, four pre-Independence
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tions is to be located in the majority judgment, it must be found
in the following two sentences:
The allegations of corruption in support of which the above-
mentioned circumstances do provide prima facie basis for
further probe into matters judicially and, if proved, would
render these documents as void, therefore, we are of the con-
sidered view that according to the public policy such matters,
which require finding about alleged criminality, are not refer-
able to Arbitration.
The disputes between the parties are not commercial disputes
arising from an undisputed legally valid contract, or relatable
to such a contract, for, according to the case of WAPDA on
account of these criminal acts disputed documents did not
bring into existence any legally binding contract between the
parties, therefore, the dispute primarily relates to very exis-
tence of a valid contract and not a dispute under such con-
tract." 4
Thus, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the anti-arbitration
injunctions on the ground of public policy."15
The Supreme Court judgment appears to hold that allega-
tions claiming a contract was procured through criminal con-
Imperial precedents, and two English precedents concerning the importance of the
"separability doctrine"). Similar comparisons could be made regarding the respective
degrees of attention given by the minority and the majority to Pakistani and English
precedents concerning the proper law of the arbitration agreement, the appropriate
scope of "public policy" as a bar to arbitration, the impact on arbitrability of allegations
of corruption or fraud, and the scope of contractual submission to arbitration. In each
case, the majority opinion either fails to discuss the topic at all or briefly states its con-
clusion without reference to any source of law. The absence in the majority judgment
of any acknowledgment of precedents, let alone other authoritative or persuasive
sources of law, is particularly striking in a court with a 50 year record of paying copious
attention to its own prior rulings and rulings by British, Indian, and other common law
courts.
114. Id. at 458.
115. Arbitration proceedings in the HubCo controversy did continue for a period
of time after the Pakistani Supreme Court confirmed the anti-arbitration injunction, as
shareholder Entergy Inc., not being a party to the Pakistani court litigation, pursued
the proceedings. Entergy ultimately discontinued the proceedings without publicly
stating a reason for its actions, but some observers link the discontinuance to the Su-
preme Court decision. Also, although HubCo subsequently applied to the Supreme
Court for a review of judgment, that application was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to
Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement made as of the 17th day of December 2000
among the GOP, WAPDA, and HubCo and finally resolving the dispute. See Naveed
Anwar, December 17 Accord Payment Schedule: Pakistan to Pay HubCo $5.25 Million a Month,
Bus. REc., Dec. 23, 2000, available at http://www.brecorder.com; Majeed, supra note 92,
at 437 n.13; Cornell & Handley, supra note 102, at 43.
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duct are sufficient to support an injunction preventing arbitra-
tion of the resulting claim that the contract was void ab initio
a16
As a factual matter, of course, this decision is especially surpris-
ing when the contract allegedly obtained through corrupt means
was an amendment to the main contract, and the arbitration
clause was located in the main contact, which was not the object
of claims of criminal misconduct. The minority judgment raised
the obvious issue: "[I] t is totally unclear how a valid contract
can-itself-become contrary to public policy because of an alle-
gation that a later amendment was the product of an illegal
act."
117
Apart from the cart-before-the-horse nature of the applica-
tion of the facts to the public policy argument, the majority judg-
ment also neglected to discuss the perhaps inconvenient legal
questions about the separability of the arbitration clause from
the remainder of a challenged contract, the authority of arbitra-
tors in the first instance to consider the scope of their own juris-
diction, the nature of the arbitration clause itself, or the parame-
ters of a public policy analysis in this area. I will now turn to
those concepts, and consider the practical impact of the Indone-
sian and Pakistani disputes.
As the HubCo minority judgment recognized, the separabil-
ity doctrine asserts that an arbitration agreement is to be
deemed independent of and separate from the contract within
which it is contained.118 In a country whose laws accept the sepa-
116. As noted above, the majority judgment summarized the accusations made by
WAPDA of improper conduct. The judgment did not, however, describe the standard
of proof against which such unilateral allegations of fraud, corruption, or illegality
should be tested as part of the process of determining whether the dispute is non-
arbitrable. See Majeed, supra note 92, at 437. Hoping that the decision may be an
aberration resulting from the highly politicized character of the HubCo dispute, that
author has found a silver lining in the "incomplete reasoning" of HubCo v. WAPDA. "It
may also be that this very omission has not closed the door completely on international
arbitration in Pakistan." Id.
117. Id. at 453. Even more oddly, the minority opinion notes that WAPDA ac-
cepted the validity of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 451.
118. See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBI-
TRATION 48 (3rd ed. 2000). This concept has been called "a conceptual cornerstone of
international arbitration." Id. The terms "separability," "severability," and "autonomy"
are often used interchangeably as identifying this concept. Thus, the minority judg-
ment in HubCo v. WAPDA repeatedly refers to the separability doctrine. See HubCo v.
WAPDA, supra note 2, at 451-53. In contrast, the phrase "autonomy principle" is pre-
ferred by the authors of a leading treatise on ICC arbitration. While subtle distinctions
might be discerned among the various titles bestowed on the doctrine, those distinc-
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rability principle, if a claim were presented to a judge that a con-
tract dispute could not be heard in arbitration because the en-
tire contract was void, the judge would be entitled to hear that
argument."' However, judicial intervention would be warranted
only if the arbitration clause itself were asserted to be defective
and invalid, not merely because it was part of a broader allegedly
invalid contract. If the Court concluded that the autonomous
arbitration provision was itself not affected by the alleged invalid-
ity of the remainder of the contract, then the judge would be
required by the separability doctrine to refer the dispute to
mandatory arbitration in accordance with the autonomous arbi-
tration clause.1 20 The minority in HubCo recognized this funda-
mental principle. The minority judgment asserted that "[u] nder
English and Pakistan laws, Arbitration clauses contained in con-
tracts are treated as separate and self-contained in that if it were
not so, arbitration clauses would not at all survive attack on the
main contract which is known as the doctrine of "separability."
1 21
The separability principle presumes that, even if the con-
tract parties entered into an invalid contract, the parties never-
theless had a separate and enforceable intent that disputes
should be resolved by a single forum, the arbitral tribunal.
122
Such a legal fiction may be difficult to justify as a matter of
logic. 123 Nevertheless, the principle of an autonomous arbitra-
tion clause is considered bedrock of international arbitration, as
otherwise the mere prima facie assertion of fraud in the induce-
ment of a contract would operate to defeat the effectiveness of
any arbitration clause. Eminentjurists and scholars have argued
that broad international consensus on this autonomy doctrine
exists, 12 and supporting cases and legislation may be found in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden,
fions do not appear to connote parallel differences between lines of cases employing
the doctrine under one or the other of the titles. Id. at 48-52.
119. Unless the legal system in question also accepted the "competence-compe-
tence" principle discussed below.
120. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118, at 49.
121. Id. at 451.
122. See id. at 451-52 (quoting Russell on Arbitration).
123. See id. at 49-50 (concluding that true justification for principle is not theoreti-
cal, but rather practical).
124. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Separability of the Arbitration Agreement, in I INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 60 (1987); CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118,
at 49-50; UK Department of Trade and Industry Consultation Document on Proposed
Clauses and Schedules for an Arbitration Bill, reprinted in 10 ARB. INT'L 187, 227 (1994).
11592001]
1160 FORDHAMIN7ERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1122
France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, and The Netherlands, 12 as
well as in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 126 which UNCITRAL claims has formed the ba-
sis in part for the arbitration laws of at least thirty-seven jurisdic-
tions. Thus, if the separability principle had been applied in
HubCo by the majority decision of the Pakistani Supreme Court,
the court could have terminated the lower court's anti-arbitra-
don injunctions on the basis that the asserted invalidity of
amendments to the WAPDA power purchase agreement did not
undermine the effectiveness of the autonomous mandatory arbi-
tration clause found in the original power purchase agree-
ment.1 27 Interestingly, the minority judgment also took pains to
conclude that, given WAPDA's acceptance of the validity of the
arbitration agreement in the underlying power purchase agree-
ment, "no issue of 'separability' actually arises in this case.' 1 28
The minority also rejected the argument of WAPDA that an ex-
ception to the separability principle existed for contracts for ille-
gal activities, quoting English case law that limited the claimed
exception to such activities as a contract for cooperation be-
tween highwaymen, slavery, drug trafficking, or the sale of alco-
hol in Pakistan. The underlying power purchase agreement,
said the Acting Chief Justice, "is a valid and entirely legal con-
tract."129
In HubCo, of course, the power purchase agreement con-
tained a contractual choice of English law as the applicable law,
and English law recognizes the separability principle in both
case law and in the English Arbitration Act 1996.130 By contrast,
the Himpurna and Patuha energy sales contracts selected Indo-
nesian law as the governing law. The Indonesian legal system
has been described as "[o] ssified, opaque and unpredictable"''
and, if the conduct of the courts in the Paiton, CalEnergy, and
similar cases is any indication, the separability principle is not
accepted in practice by local jurists. Indonesia is, though, party
125. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118, at 50 n.15.
126. U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
127. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 451.
128. Id. at 452-53.
129. Id. at 453.
130. See generally Arbitration Act, 1996, sched. 4 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Arbi-
tration Act].
131. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-25.
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to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"),
which states that "[t] he court of a Contracting State, when seized
of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have
made [a written arbitration agreement], shall, at the request of
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapa-
ble of being performed."1 3 2 An argument can be made that this
provision of the New York Convention itself embraces the sepa-
rability principle, on the grounds that the phrase "the said agree-
ment" refers solely to the written arbitration agreement. Thus,
authority for a court to avoid referring a matter to arbitration is
limited strictly to circumstances where the agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration is itself void. However, contrary argu-
ments can also be made from the text, and there is no indication
that Indonesian courts have seriously addressed the question in
published opinions.
Notwithstanding a general rule of separability, dicta in one
well-known arbitration decision raises for consideration whether
circumstances of proven bribery might be a special case in which
the separability principle is not applicable. Professor Claude
Reymond, the president of the ICC arbitral tribunal hearing the
dispute between Westinghouse and National Power Corporation
of the Philippines over a controversial nuclear power plant, re-
marked in a ruling on that matter:
There may be instances where a defect going to the root
of an agreement between parties affects both the main con-
tract and the arbitration clause. An obvious example is a con-
tract obtained by threat. With regard to the impact of brib-
ery, it would remain to be seen whether bribery, if proved,
affects both the main contract and the arbitration clause and
renders both null and void.
133
Professor Reymond's observation is premised, though, upon
proven bribery, not untested allegations as found in the Indone-
sian and Pakistani cases. He thus appears to presume an inde-
pendent inquiry into the bribery allegations to have occurred
132. New York Convention art. 11.3.
133. Westinghouse International Projects Co. (U.S.A.) et al. v. National Power Co.
(Philippines) and the Republic of the Philippines (Philippines), ICC Case No. 6401/
BGD (Preliminary Award on Issues ofJurisdiction and Contract Validity, Dec. 19, 1991),
7 MEALEv'S INT'L L. REP. B-1, B-14 (1992).
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before the affected arbitration clause can be invalidated. Profes-
sor Reymond's comment however is not inconsistent with a
court-ordered stay of arbitral proceedings pending a judicial in-
quiry into the alleged bribery. If bribery going to the underlying
creation of the main contract ought indeed be an exception to
the general rule of separability, then the actions of the Indone-
sian and Pakistani courts may be construed as decisions to halt
arbitration proceedings until the corruption allegations at issue
were fully considered in a judicial forum. Still, the Indonesian
and Pakistani courts did not require that the bribery allegations
first be proven, but did assert a right to block deliberations by
the arbitrators. The question accordingly arises whether it is the
arbitral tribunal, or a court, that ought in the first instance con-
sider such questions, or whether both forums may proceed on
independent adjudication tracks.
The Pakistani Supreme Court concluded that the judicial
system was the proper forum in which to consider the matter,
and not the arbitration arbitral tribunal. Thus, by virtue of the
injunction, the ability of the arbitrator in HubCo to examine
their own jurisdiction was blocked. Certain of the litigation tac-
tics of the State enterprises in HubCo, as well as the CalEnergy
and Paiton controversies, are not so far removed from Western
judicial precedents as to be wholly outside the mainstream of law
in this area. The views of courts in Western countries appear to
differ as the proper roles of the courts and arbitral tribunals in
considering jurisdictional challenges in such circumstances.
The general approach of U.S. courts to the timing of judicial
intervention has been to permit an arbitral tribunal to proceed
despite fraudulent inducement claims.'34 The term "compe-
tence-competence" (literally, jurisdiction concerning jurisdic-
tion) is often used to describe the principle under which an arbi-
tral tribunal itself has the authority to decide whether it has juris-
diction to consider a dispute, 135 although such authority may still
be reconsidered by a court once a reviewable award has been
rendered by the tribunal. The application of "competence-com-
petence" doctrine may, however, have several different mean-
ings.'36 First, it may simply mean that, when a party claims an
134. See PARK, supra note 81, at 91.
135. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118, at 512.
136. Id. at 512-13.
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arbitration clause to be invalid, the arbitrators need not halt ar-
bitration proceedings and defer the issue exclusively to a court.
The arbitrators would be entitled to proceed with their responsi-
bilities, but a court may simultaneously consider the claim that
the clause is invalid. Second, the phrase may refer to delaying
judicial review of arbitral jurisdiction until after an award has
been issued by the arbitral tribunal. The tribunal would conse-
quently have an opportunity to consider its own jurisdiction
before ajudicial forum could address the point. Third, and only
rarely, "competence-competence" may mean that the decisions
of arbitrators as to their own jurisdiction are not judicially re-
viewable at all. In HubCo, the minority judgment relied on a
number of Pakistani and English sources in apparent defense of
the position that, where the arbitration clause is broadly written,
courts must defer to the jurisdiction of arbitrators to decide the
validity of a contract even in the face of challenges to the very
existence of a legally binding contract." 7 The minority further
noted that any resulting award could, at the time of enforcement
in Pakistan, be challenged "as to its validity on any ground what-
soever permissible under any Pakistani Law."' 38 The Acting
Chief Justice, therefore, accepted "competence-competence,"
subject to review upon enforcement, but did not address chal-
lenges to arbitral jurisdiction in the Pakistani courts in circum-
stances in which enforcement occurs outside Pakistan. The ma-
jority judgment, of course, was silent on all of these issues.
The scope of judicial deference to the authority of arbitra-
tors to determine their own competence is not well settled in the
West. While U.S. courts have regularly deferred review of arbi-
tral jurisdictions until after issuance of an award, the English
courts have historically been more willing to intervene at an ear-
lier stage.' 39 However, the recent English Arbitration Act 1996
("English Act") appears to narrow this flexibility. Section 30 of
the Act contemplates that the arbitrators may themselves decide
the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and the matters
properly submitted to arbitration in accordance with that agree-
ment,14 ° while Section 67 entitles a court to review that decision
137. Id. at 452-53.
138. Id. at 456.
139. PARK, supra note 81, at 82.
140. CRaIG ET sA.., supra note 118, at 538. The relevant part of the Act reads as
follows:
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in a subsequent court challenge to the jurisdictional determina-
tion.14' The English Act does, however, recognize the right of a
party who is not participating in the arbitration proceedings to
seek a court injunction on the ground that there is no valid arbi-
tration agreement or that the subject matter is not arbitrable. 42
The approaches taken by U.S. courts and by the English Arbitra-
tion Act thus permit the allegations of corruption or other fraud-
ulent inducement to be tested first in the arbitration proceeding
and only thereafter in a national court, unless the court action is
brought by a non-participant in the arbitration. This procedural
right afforded to non-participants by the English statute may be
different, though, from the procedural right Pertamina sought
to exercise by seeking injunctive relief from the Central District
Court ofJakarta as a non-participant in the proceedings brought
by Patuha and Himpurna against PLN and the Republic of Indo-
nesia,'43 as it is not clear whether the English Act affords ajudi-
cial forum to a party who, like Pertamina, is never named as a
respondent in the arbitration by the claimant.
This difference, though, may be less important in a case
where the non-participant is controlled by a participant, which
appeared to the Tribunal to be the situation in the CalEnergy
cases. The arbitral tribunal in Patuha and Himpurna was unper-
suaded that Pertamina was not a participant in substance, hold-
ing that the Government had been in a legal position to control
Pertamina and had failed to do so. The Tribunal noted that
(1) unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its
own substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to-
(a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement,
(c) . . . what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the arbitration agreement.
English Arbitration Act ch. 23 § 30.
141. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118, at 538-39. The English Act permits the Court
proceedings about arbitral jurisdiction to be stayed only if the Court is satisfied that the
arbitration agreement itself is not null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being
performed. English Arbitration Act § 67.
142. Section 72 of the English Arbitration Act states the following:
(1) A person alleged to be a party to arbitral proceedings but who takes no
part in the proceedings may question-
(a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement,
(b) ... , or what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the arbitration agreement.
English Arbitration Act ch. 23 § 72.
143. Patuha-ROI Interim Award, supra note 1, at B-8.
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Pertamina is constituted by law as a state enterprise, wholly
owned by the Republic, and that its Board of Commissioners and
Managing Directors serve by appointment of the President of
the Republic. Moreover, the Tribunal concluded that the Re-
public's actual conduct offered no excuse from responsibility for
the anti-arbitration injunction. Thus, "the Republic of Indone-
sia cannot be excused for an alleged inability to exercise its pow-
ers effectively . .. [and] the Republic of Indonesia has offered
no proof of the slightest attempt to rein in Pertamina."1 4 The
tribunal in the Indonesian cases appears to have reasoned that
Pertamina was the alter ego of the GOI for purposes of holding a
participant to its obligation to not interfere with arbitration pro-
ceedings to which it had voluntarily submitted.
145
Even more so than in the United States or the United King-
dom, the timing of intervention by European courts is flexible.
The European Convention on International Commercial Arbi-
tration146 provides that, if courts of a Contracting State are re-
quested to rule on the question whether an arbitration agree-
ment is null and void after arbitration has commenced, those
courts "shall stay their ruling on the arbitrator's jurisdiction until
the arbitral award is made, unless they have good and substantial
reasons to the contrary. ' 147 Thus, the European Convention be-
gins at the same starting point as U.S. and U.K. precedents, by
disfavoring judicial intervention. However, the European Con-
144. Id. at B-29.
145. If a participant in an arbitration is responsible for conduct of controlled enti-
ties seeking to interfere with the proceedings, then logically controlled parties should
also be within the scope of mandatory arbitration regardless of the actual terms of the
arbitration clause. In Patuha and Himpurna, the contract negotiations sought to avoid
this issue in part by prohibiting the contract parties (including Pertamina) from seek-
ingjudicial intervention: "no party shall have any right to commence or maintain any
suit or legal proceeding concerning a dispute hereunder until the dispute has been
determined in accordance with the arbitration procedure provided for herein and then
only for enforcement of the award rendered in such arbitration." See Patuha-PLNFinal
Award, supra note 2, at B-4 (quoting § 8.3 of the ESCs). Interestingly, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York in a recent decision involving a project finance
transaction rejected an effort by the U.S. parent of a subsidiary, party to an arbitration
agreement with an Argentina mining company, to compel the Argentine company to
dismiss a court action against the parent in favor of arbitration under the mandatory
arbitration clause between the subsidiary and the Argentine plaintiff. Minera Alum-
brera Ltd. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *6368 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1999).
146. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21,
1961, 484 U.N.T.S.7041 [hereinafter European Arbitration Convention].
147. European Arbitration Convention art. VI.3.
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vention is explicit in recognizing that a court may intervene on
jurisdictional issues prior to issuance of the award for "good and
substantial reasons." The European treaty thus effectively estab-
lishes a rebuttable presumption in favor of delaying judicial in-
tervention.
Several practical consequences of such a delay in judicial
involvement should be apparent. Least controversially, the issue
of ultra vires exercise of authority by an arbitral panel may be
mooted by the panel's own determination that it lacks authority
over the matter. More significantly, if court review of the author-
ity of a panel to address a dispute is deferred until the enforce-
ment phase of the dispute then, while enforcement may be re-
fused in one State (for example, the host country in which the
corrupt acts allegedly occurred), assets of the losing party may
remain at risk of enforcement actions in other countries unless
courts in those other countries give effect to the judicial determi-
nation of lack of arbitral jurisdiction by the first State. This is, of
course, the risk to WAPDA left unaddressed in the majority judg-
ment.
Such a situation raises the issue of international recognition
of the jurisdictional decision of the court in the host country.
Recognition of a court decision denying jurisdiction to the panel
is an especially difficult question if the reviewing court is not lo-
cated in the same State as the seat of the arbitration. The New
York Convention entitles, but does not necessarily require, 48 a
court to refuse recognition and enforcement if the award "has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made. ' 149 Accordingly, annulment of an award by a court at the
seat of the arbitration, for example annulment of the awards
against PLN by the Jakarta court, falls squarely within one of the
enumerated defenses to enforcement under the New York Con-
vention. As the quoted language makes clear, this defense ex-
tends to awards annulled by a court of the country under the law
148. Articles V.1 and V.2 of the New York Convention provide that "recognition
and enforcement of the award may" be refused by reason of one of the defenses enu-
merated in that Article. Id. art. V.1-2 (emphasis added). The equally official French
version ("ne seront refus~es") is more emphatic regarding the responsibility of the en-
forcement jurisdiction to decline to recognize or enforce an award falling within the
terms of one of the defenses. See PARK, supra note 81, at 76.
149. New York Convention art. V.I(e).
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of which the award was made, and therefore the New York Con-
vention also arguably contemplates deference to an annulment
decision made by a court located in the jurisdiction of the
choice-of-law clause in the contract.
150
A difference important to State and investors alike thus ex-
ists between the Himpurna and Patuha disputes, on the one
hand, and the HubCo dispute, on the other. Recall that the
PLN energy sales contracts in the Indonesian transactions speci-
fied Indonesian law as the governing law and provided that the
seat of the arbitration would be Jakarta. Had the Central Jakarta
District Court deferred its intervention unless after the issuance
of the award, and then set the award aside for reasons of lack of
arbitral jurisdiction or non-arbitrability, the successful claimants
would have faced a difficult time enforcing their awards against
PLN or the GOI in the courts of any State party to the New York
Convention. 51 In contrast, the WAPDA power purchase agree-
ment in the HubCo transaction was governed by English law and
the chosen situs of the arbitration was London. Unlike PLN,
therefore, WAPDA would not have been able to employ the
quoted provision of the New York Convention to block enforce-
ment in third countries of an award in favor of HubCo. The
potential, accordingly, exists for a race among litigators in the
host State seeking a decision that the arbitral panel acted outside
its authority and litigators in another State in which valuable as-
sets are found seeking to realize on the arbitral award before it is
voided by the first State.
These U.S., English, and European approaches might not
offend the sovereignty of a State whose interest in a dispute is
confined to passively serving as the seat of the arbitration pro-
ceedings. It is easy, though, to see greater sensitivity on the part
of a reviewing court (whether the impulse be pure or self-inter-
ested) when the alleged corruption involves State authorities of
150. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118, at 510. A U.S. District Court has declined the
opportunity afforded by this language to annul a Mexican award concerning a contract
governed by New York law. See International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial., 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
151. The claimants in Patuha and Himpurna looked to their equity political risk
insurance policies for recovery rather than enforcement actions against PLN or GOI
assets. The choice ofJakarta as the arbitral seat, therefore, had no impact on the recov-
ery strategy of CalEnergy, and similar enforcement considerations could influence the
negotiating position of insured investors in other project transactions regarding the
location of the arbitral seat. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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the home country. Regardless of how inappropriate the anti-ar-
bitration injunctions might have been as a matter of law, it is not
surprising that the Indonesian and Pakistani courts would con-
sider intervening in disputes involving allegations of corruption
with respect to public contracts and national programs, rather
than leaving issues affecting public policy to be addressed in the
first instance by international arbitral panels. These host State
concerns would undoubtedly persist even if persuasive legal ar-
guments could demonstrate that an enforcing jurisdiction would
give effect to a court decision in the host State voiding the award
on grounds that a dispute related to corruption allegations is not
arbitrable in the host country. In contrast to national court pro-
ceedings almost everywhere, the intended neutrality of senti-
ment in arbitration undermines the prospect that local public
policy perspectives constitute the framework within which the
dispute is resolved. Moreover, the confidentiality of arbitration
limits transparency and thus accountability for decisions on is-
sues of public morals and effective governance.
Neither separability nor "competence-competence," how-
ever, occupied the attention of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in
HubCo. v. WAPDA. Instead, notions of public policy dominated
the thinking of that Court. The Pakistani Supreme Court inter-
vened because "according to the public policy such matters [alle-
gations of corruption], which require finding about alleged
criminality, are not referable to Arbitration." By employing pub-
lic policy interests to stay the HubCo arbitration proceedings,
the Pakistani Supreme Court effectively asserted the primacy of
Pakistani public policies regarding criminality as a factor overrid-
ing respect for the independence of arbitration institutions. Pa-
kistan and Indonesia are, of course, not alone in applying public
policy concerns to limit arbitration as a dispute settlement proce-
dure. Ordinarily, though, matters of public policy become issues
at the time of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,
rather than arising as issues of original jurisdiction. To clarify
the limits of the notion of public policy itself, it is nevertheless
helpful to review the use of public policy, and its sister defense of
non-arbitrability, to vitiate arbitral awards at the enforcement
stage.
The New York Convention's public policy and non-arbi-
trability defenses to enforcement of arbitration awards "serve as
an explicit catch-all for the forum's particular substantive public
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policy. 1 5 2 Thus, the New York Convention explicitly authorizes
a court in an enforcing country to refuse recognition and en-
forcement upon finding that " [t] he recognition or enforcement
of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that coun-
try."15 However, the public policies contemplated by this provi-
sion of the New York Convention are those of the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought, not the public policies
of the host State of the investment. If HubCo had sought to en-
force an award in Pakistan, of course, then the local courts
would be authorized by applicable Pakistani law to apply Pakis-
tani public policy principles in considering whether or not to
permit HubCo to realize on the award. If, instead, HubCo
sought to enforce an arbitral award against assets of WAPDA or
the GOP in another New York Convention country, the court in
that third country would consider its own public policies (not
Pakistani policies) in determining if the public policy defense
was available to refuse enforcement. The New York Convention,
therefore, acknowledges the role of public policy in guiding the
conduct of the enforcing State, but does not accord similar ac-
knowledgment to the public policies of the State hosting the in-
vestor.
Utilizing public policy arguments as a shield against arbitra-
tion awards is most effective to a host State if the role of public
policy in judicial decision-making is broadly conceived. How-
ever, U.S. and European cases generally limit the use of the pub-
lic policy defense narrowly, out of concern that broad invoca-
tions of public policy could undermine the perceived advantages
of a neutral arbitration forum. 54 Thus, the Second Circuit has
criticized a broad reach of the public policy defense in the fol-
lowing terms: "to read the public policy defense as a parochial
device protective of national political interests would seriously
undermine the Convention's utility."155 Instead, the court lim-
152. PARK, supra note 81, at 87. Note that the European Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration does not incorporate a public policy defense to recogni-
tion and enforcement of awards, but does authorize refusal of recognition of an arbitra-
tion agreement if under the law of the enforcement forum the dispute is not capable of
settlement by arbitration. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion art. VI.2. See also PARK, supra note 81, at 130.
153. New York Convention art. V.2(b).
154. PARK, supra note 81, at 99.
155. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societ6 G~n~rale De L'industrie Du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ited the defense solely to breaches of "the forum state's most
basic notions of morality and justice."156 To the contrary, oppo-
nents of a narrow reading of the public policy defense argue that
a restricted notion of public policy "threatens the legitimate reg-
ulatory policies of both developed and developing countries."1
57
Such criticisms are not made solely by advocates of protection
for developing countries such as Indonesia and Pakistan. In
North America, the investor-State arbitration provisions of the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the
World Trade Organization have recently come under attack by
environmental activists and others. Those activists have been an-
gered by such decisions as the award in Metalclad Corporation v.
United Mexican States,151 which upheld an indirect expropriation
claim under NAFTA by a U.S. investor in a Mexican landfill pro-
ject on the basis that regional and local Mexican government
authorities had denied a local environmental permit without au-
thority and improperly taken other steps to prevent the landfill
site from being developed. Whether the opposition to arbitra-
tion consists of local interests in developing countries or interna-
tional environmental activists, in each situation critics fear the
ability of an "unaccountable, non-transparent" independent ar-
bitration panel to ignore policy and political concerns of local
authorities in favor of giving strict effect to the negotiated terms
of a contract that later proves disadvantageous to local public
interests. Such concerns are not unwarranted. It is in fact likely
that the complicated governing law provisions in the Himpurna
and Patuha energy sale contracts authorizing the Tribunal to de-
part from strict rules of Indonesian law when considered to be
inconsistent with the spirit of the contract and the underlying
intent of the parties, 5 ' were in part intended to limit the ability
of the Indonesian side to use the power of local law and regula-
tion to undermine negotiated contract terms.
Public policy concerns are covered not only by the public
156. Id.
157. PARK, supra note 81, at 99 (quoting Armfelt, Avoiding the Arbitration Trap, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at 17, cols. 1-4).
158. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, (Aug. 2000), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com. Activists have also objected to a string of decisions by
World Trade Organization arbitral panels limiting the scope of environmental regula-
tions that affect international trade.
159. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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policy defense, but by the "non-arbitrability" defense as well;
"[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settle-
ment by arbitration under the law of that country.'"160 Like the
public policy defense itself, the scope of the non-arbitrability de-
fense also has the potential to be extremely broad; it is hard to
conceive of a law that does not affect the interests of society at
large. Thus, claims of non-arbitrability by reason of public policy
concerns or statutory occupation of the field can be made in any
area of legislative or regulatory enactment. Here too, though,
the New York Convention is clear that the public policies at issue
are those of the enforcement forum.16 Parties seeking to block
arbitration therefore look to national laws and national courts to
employ host-State authority to withdraw disputes from arbitral
jurisdiction. In the United States, respondents in arbitrations
have argued to courts that a host of issues are non-arbitrable;
among them claims related to antitrust law, securities regulation,
commodities futures regulation, truth in lending, civil rights,
franchise statutes, patents, and bankruptcy. While "judicial sus-
picion of arbitration may have seen steady erosion since the mid-
1970's, particularly with respect to contracts containing an inter-
national element,"a62 consumer advocates, environmental orga-
nizations, and human rights groups in the United States and
other Western countries have instead grown more suspicious of
arbitration as a system "captured" by pro-business elements.
Outside the wealthy West and Japan, it is perhaps more accurate
to say that suspicion of the "pro-foreign" and "pro-investor" bias
of the independent arbitration process has always been high and
is given expression in decisions such as HubCo and the various
anti-arbitration injunctions issued by the Indonesian courts.
The foregoing review establishes two fundamental points.
First, a substantial risk exists that courts in developing countries
will intervene to halt arbitration of disputes between investors
and public authorities of that country, particularly in circum-
stances of pervasive economic and political turmoil and corrup-
tion. Second, even Western jurisprudence on arbitrability issues
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate interference by Western
courts. Some may argue in favor of such a result, granting ulti-
160. New York Convention art. V.2(a).
161. So too, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
with respect to non-arbitrability of disputes. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162. PARK, supra note 81, at 98.
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mate control of issues affecting the public exclusively to public
institutions. Others, like the author, remain concerned with the
reliability and accountability of public authorities in weak States,
whether because of possible corruption or political influence on
the local court system or because of the absence of experience
with the best political and commercial practices.163
Is arbitrability a fiction in these circumstances? If, as seems
too often to be the case, rampant misconduct in a weak State
assures that virtually every large public contract is at risk of cor-
ruption claims, will the presence of non-frivolous allegations of
corruption effectively prevent foreign investors from obtaining
the benefit of a neutral arbitral tribunal? To answer "yes" re-
quires concluding that courts in many States of the world would
react as have courts in Indonesia and Pakistan to the role of arbi-
tral panels in deciding issues of great national sensitivity. Such a
bleak conclusion may be an overgeneralization, failing to take
account of the wide differences among the many countries in
the developing world. It may also fail to take account of steps
that project sponsors can take to mitigate the risks that local
courts will intervene in arbitration proceedings without cause. It
is worthwhile to consider the tools available to contract negotia-
tions before reaching such a harsh determination.
While it should go without saying that a properly drafted
arbitration clause is the first step, it must sadly be admitted that
too many arbitration clauses in international project financings
are drafted without an understanding of the potential limits to
arbitrability. Care needs to be taken to assure that the language
describing the scope of the potential disputes to be submitted to
arbitration is sufficiently broad to encompass claims that the
transaction was fraudulently induced by corrupt means or other-
wise entered into in violation of applicable law. From the inves-
tor's perspective, there is no virtue in offering a local court the
opportunity to claim that such a dispute falls outside the intent
of the parties and the negotiated terms of the arbitration clause.
The question of whether or not parties to a particular arbi-
163. As the U.S. Department of State has noted in the U.S. Department of State,
Country Commercial Guide for FY 2000: Pakistan, at http://www.state.gov/www/about_
state/business/com-guides/2000/sa/pakistanCCG2000.pdf, "[t]he biggest challenge
facing American firms in Pakistan is lack of transparency in government decision-mak-
ing, coupled with allegations of systemic corruption." With respect to Indonesia, see
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tration provision intend to cover claims of fraudulent induce-
ment of the contract has been described as turning on "eye-
crossing subtleties." '16 4 While it is not clear exactly what the Paki-
stan Supreme Court meant in HubCo. v. WAPDA by commenting
that "[t]he disputes between the parties are not commercial dis-
putes arising from . . [a] contract, or relatable to such a contract
... , therefore, the dispute primarily relates to a very existence of
a valid contract and not a dispute under such a contract,"'65 it is
at least possible that the majority judgment sought to claim that
disputes about criminal acts inducing creation of project docu-
ments fell outside the agreed terms of the arbitration provision.
WAPDA's counsel did indeed argue "that the parties arbitration
clause was of limited scope, inasmuch as that it applied only to
the meaning and interpretation of the agreement between the
parties, its effect and its alleged breach by one or other of the
parties." '166 If such an argument was accepted by the Court, how-
ever, it does not appear consistent with other efforts to interpret
similar language, as was recognized by the minority judgment.
In the minority, the Acting Chief Justice stated that "learned
counsel for HUBCO repelled the contentions of learned counsel
for WAPDA" and recited with apparent approval the opinion of
HubCo's counsel that "as a matter of English law, this arbitration
clause is extremely broad in its scope and covered disputes well
beyond the limited range suggested by WAPDA.
16 7
The negotiated arbitration clause in the WAPDA power
purchase agreement covered "any dispute or difference of any
kind whatsoever.., between WAPDA ... and the Company in
connection with or arising out of this Agreement .... ",168 That
clause is slightly broader than the ICC Model clause, which en-
compasses "[a]ll disputes arising out of or in connection with
the present contract. " "' The phrase "in connection with,"
which is not mentioned in the portions of the HubCo majorityjudgment quoted above, covers a wide array of issues. Thus, the
164. PARK, supra note 81, at 107 n.460.
165. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 458 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 450. Cf supra note 65 and accompanying text for similar arguments by
PLN in Paiton Controversy.
167. Id. at 450-51.
168. See HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 444 (quoting Clause 15.2 of WAPDA
power purchase agreement).
169. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 118, at 88.
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Supreme Court of India has held the phrase "arising in connec-
tion with" to be "of the widest amplitude and content and in-
clude[s] even questions as to the existence, validity and effect
(scope) of the arbitration agreement."'' 70
The arbitration clauses in Himpurna and Patuha, in con-
trast, employed phrases that might have created unnecessary
problems of arbitrability. Section 8.2 of the ESCs, you will recall,
covered "[d]isputes, if any, arising between PLN on the one
hand, and PERTAMINA and/or COMPANY on the other hand,
relating to this Contract or the interpretation and performance
of any of the provisions of this Contract. "171 In U.S. jurispru-
dence, such phrasing might be construed more narrowly than
the HubCo clause. Thus, the Second Circuit has held that arbi-
tration clauses in sales agreements using the words "arising
under" or "relating to" did not extend to a tortious interference
claim based on an allegation that an executive officer of the
buyer had been bribed to approve inferior goods, 172 although it
did cover related fraudulent inducement, bribery, unfair trade
practices, unjust enrichment, mail and wire fraud, and RICO
claims.17 1 In another Second Circuit decision, the majority con-
cluded that the phrase "any question or dispute arising or occur-
ring under the contract" was broader than another clause cover-
ing "disputes or controversies under or arising out of the con-
tract," and that the former phrasing would reach claims of
fraudulent inducement while the latter would not.1 7 4 In con-
trast, the dissenting opinion found no meaningful difference be-
tween the two formulations, but would have held the fraudulent
inducement claim non-arbitrable in both cases. 175 The Fourth
Circuit has interpreted the ICC-recommended phrase "in con-
170. See id. at 88 (quoting Renusagar Power Co. (India) v. General Electric Co.
(U.S.)). As noted in the minority judgment of HubCo v. WAPDA, the courts of Pakistan
have also employed this phrase-the "widest amplitude and content"-to uphold arbi-
trability of a dispute over proper authorization of a contract containing a submission to
arbitration covering "any dispute in respect of interpretation of the agreement or con-
cerning anything contained therein." See HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 452 (citing
Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Frederick J. Whyte Group (Group) Pakistan &
Others (PLD 1997 SC 48)).
171. Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-4.
172. Genesco Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 856 (2d Cir. 1987).
173. Id. at 847-56.
174. S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194-95
(2d Cir. 1984).
175. Id. at 197.
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nection with this Agreement" broadly to cover "every dispute be-
tween the parties having a significant relationship to the contract
regardless of the label attached to the dispute. ' 176 To the con-
trary, the Ninth Circuit has held fraudulent inducement claims
of a contract associated with the central contract to be outside
the scope of the expression "arising hereunder. ' 177 Eye-crossing
subtlety, indeed.
The lesson, perhaps, is that contract drafters should em-
brace broadly written provisions such as found in the WAPDA
power purchase agreement, but that drafting skill alone cannot
prevent a determined court from holding that fraud or corrup-
tion allegations render a dispute non-arbitrable.
A second issue is created by the choice of the situs of the
arbitration itself. The location of the arbitration did not affect
the local court decisions in HubCo, nor, in the end, did it affect
the conduct of the two non-Indonesian arbitrators in Himpurna
and Patuha. Still, the seat of the arbitration in the Indonesian
disputes was Jakarta and the chosen governing law was Indone-
sian law. As noted above, the recognition and enforcement of
any resulting award may be refused by courts applying the New
York Convention if the award has been annulled by a court "in
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made." The responsibility of an enforcement court to give effect
to an annulment of an award by a court at the arbitral seat
should therefore be carefully considered by contract drafters. It
has become more common in international project financings to
accept host country situs for arbitration proceedings. Accept-
ance of host country situs has occurred particularly where, as is
the case with the new Indian arbitration act, 7 8 the proceedings
will be considered under local law as an international arbitration
notwithstanding the domestic situs. The resulting award would
thus be entitled to the benefit of the enforcement provisions of
the New York Convention.
Clauses submitting to local arbitration at host country seats
are found in a number of Colombian infrastructure projects and
176. JJ. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 321 (4th
Cir. 1988).
177. Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1463-65 (9th
Cir. 1983).
178. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Law No. 26 (Aug. 16, 1996) (In-
dia), available at http://www.ficci.com/icanet/law.htm.
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elsewhere in Latin America, in several recent power purchase
agreements for Indian projects, and under a large number of
telecommunications concessions worldwide. As many of these
projects have been financed on a limited recourse basis in the
bank or institutional investor markets, local arbitral sites have
passed the acid test of "financeability." Where the choice of the
seat of the arbitration is a matter for negotiation, once assured
that local law will treat the arbitration proceeding as an "interna-
tional arbitration" for recognition and enforcement purposes,
few investor's counsel consider the implications of such a choice
on enforceability of an eventual arbitration award in third coun-
tries. As many of the local obligors in those transactions do not
have significant attachable assets outside the host State, it is also
possible of course that investor parties have made a conscious
decision to forego the broadest enforcement options in light of a
determined negotiating position on the part of the local obligor.
That would not, however, seem to have been a likely approach in
the Indonesian disputes. Indonesia is a petroleum-exporting
country, and the GOI and Pertamina (the national oil and gas
monopoly) were both parties to project documents in these
transactions. Litigators, therefore, would see prospects for en-
forcing awards against receivables owing to the Indonesian State
on account of petroleum transactions. Similar opportunities ex-
ist whenever the State itself is an obligor and thus a variety of off-
shore assets exist. Equally, third country enforcement prospects
should be kept in mind when the project generates hard-cur-
rency revenues.
The situation faced by Professor Priyatna in the Indonesian
cases also raises an issue for contract negotiation. As an Indone-
sian national, Professor Priyatna was presented with serious per-
sonal risks in disregarding the injunction of the Central Jakarta
District Court. While the other two arbitrators, Mr. Paulsson and
Mr. de Fina, acted firmly in moving forward with hearings at the
Peace Palace, the courage of Professor Priyatna in traveling to
The Hague in an effort to attend the hearings demonstrates a
level of commitment and responsiveness one cannot blithely an-
ticipate of arbitrators, no matter how professional. To limit the
risk that an improperly conceived local injunction can impede
proceedings outside the host country by preventing the partici-
pation of a local arbitrator, it may be prudent to include in the
arbitration clause a requirement that none of the arbitrators be
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a national of the country of any disputant. Thus, the WAPDA
power purchase agreement provided that "[n]o arbitrator ...
shall be a national of the jurisdiction of either party to this
Agreement or of the jurisdiction of any of the Initial Sharehold-
ers."1 79 Such a rule has occasionally been incorporated into arbi-
tration agreements as additional assurance of the neutrality of
the arbitrators, but the risk of anti-arbitration injunctions is yet
another reason to include the clause in arbitration provisions.
Merely selecting arbitrators from outside the host country,
however, cannot affect the more obvious points of jurisdictional
contact with that State; the nationality and location of assets of
the project company and various other project participants.
Many countries require that only locally-incorporated entities
own or operate major infrastructure projects, and the principal
tangible assets of an infrastructure project are usually found
within the host State's territory.1 ° While project counterparties
such as a power purchaser are invariably locally-organized, an
arbitral tribunal may be willing to ignore the impact of the in-
junction on those entities if they are State-owned, reasoning as
did the arbitrators in Himpurna and Patuha that the host gov-
ernment de facto and dejure controls the conduct of those enti-
ties. However, the risk to a project company of disobeying a lo-
cal injunction is much higher. In such circumstances, the pro-
ject company, its sponsors, and its international lenders must be
prepared to abandon local assets and risk large fines on the com-
pany and even imprisonment for its officers and employees.
Why did the CalEnergy-sponsored projects take those risks,
when the HubCo investors did not? One difference between
HubCo, on the one hand, and Himpurna and Patuha, on the
other hand, can easily be identified; US$290 million of equity
political risk insurance issued by reliable insurers outside the
host State. The decision by CalEnergy to risk the loss of power
plant assets inside Indonesia in favor of recovery on the insur-
ance policies is a simpler, though by no means easy, calculation
than the difficulties faced by the international investors in
HubCo. The decision to pursue arbitration must necessarily
179. HubCo v. WAPDA, supra note 2, at 445 (quoting Clause 15.4(d) of power
purchase agreement).
180. Cf Patuha-PLNFinal Award, supra note 2, at B-22 (discussing PLN's unsuccess-
ful argument that Indonesian law permitted only Indonesian-incorporated entities to
participate in power production activities in that country).
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have involved a decision to risk the loss of the power plants in
Indonesia in favor of a more valuable asset, an arbitration award
effectively entitling the investors to realize on the political risk
policies. We may speculate that, without access to those insur-
ance policies, the Himpurna and Patuha arbitrations might not
have continued in the teeth of the local anti-arbitration injunc-
tion and related fines. Had the anti-arbitration injunction been
issued before PLN's liability became clear in the first set of arbi-
tration, moreover, the investor's balance of risk and reward
might have shifted against continuing the proceedings. 181 Thus,
the Indonesian disputes illustrate the value of political risk insur-
ance and illustrate as well the importance of moving swiftly in
the arbitral proceedings to a decision on the merits.
The investors are not the only project parties faced with the
need to balance these risks. So too are the host country actors.
The governments of Pakistan and Indonesia both had to con-
sider the risk that "[w] hatever its short-term benefits, using pub-
lic policy as an excuse to disregard freely-negotiated obligations
will chill future infusions of wealth-creating capital and technol-
ogy, and may backfire to inhibit international commercial and
financial cooperation. 18 2 The decision by President Wahid in
181. A point that might very well have motivated PLN to strike first in the Paiton
controversy by seeking court protection before the project company could commence
arbitration.
182. PARK, supra note 81, at 140. The arbitrators in Patuha and Himpurna argued
similarly:
However tempting it may be in the context of a particular case for a public-
sector respondent to seek relief from liability by invoking illegality, the fact is
that such a posture puts into question the reliability of undertakings of the
country in question. When a country's reputation as a contractual partner
suffers, the terms on which it is able to attract foreign investment and financ-
ing are impaired. Indeed, this concern goes beyond whatever cost/benefit
calculations might be made by the officials of a particular country at a particu-
lar time, because an over-readiness by international arbitrators to accept ille-
gality defenses may harm an international mechanism which benefits numer-
ous countries that rely on access to international funding, technology, and
trade.
Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 2, at B-18. However, these concerns about the ad-
verse impact of interference with investment contracts on access to sources of interna-
tional capital may be overstated. Arguably, the international financial community does
not have such a collective long-term memory. It is, for example, striking that the first
large limited recourse power project in an emerging market, the Pagbilao project in the
Philippines, reached financial close in 1993, a short 10 years after the Philippines de-
clared a moratorium on all its external indebtedness. Competition among investors,
turnover of personnel, and the pressure to show a profit "now" may all conspire to draw
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the Paiton controversy to order PLN to withdraw its court case
against the project company, in apparent recognition of the con-
sequences of angering the U.S. and Japanese governments and
their important multinational corporations at a time when those
governments were necessary to Indonesian economic diplomacy,
is perhaps a demonstration of that process at work. However,
the Paiton example merely offers a case in which both the local
litigation and the international arbitration were halted through
political intervention in favor of negotiations. That same politi-
cal intervention produced an interim agreement enabling the
project company to continue to cover operating expenses and
service interest on its debt, but like other Indonesian IPPs there
is no indication that the Paiton dispute is near a long-term solu-
tion.
For many investors the speed of political intervention may
seem glacial as the uncovered costs of a project in dispute (prin-
cipally interest accruing on project loans and foregone equity
distributions) increase throughout the suspension period. Thus,
in Indonesia the initial decrees postponing projects were issued
in December 1997 and January 1998 but, as this Essay goes to
press in April 2001, no major fully-constructed IPP in Indonesia
has yet finalized renegotiations with PLN. Just the unpaid inter-
est costs of deferring a project's revenue stream for thirty-six
months creates large financial consequences. For example, sim-
ple interest of six percent per annum on, hypothetically, US$200
million of limited recourse loans during this period would in-
crease project costs by at least US$36 million without regard to
the impact of any compounding, all without any obvious source
of revenue to cover those increased costs. If that project has a
fairly common seventy-five to twenty-five percent debt-to-equity
ratio, the impact of that increase in liability effectively destroys
the equity returns to the project's shareholders. Further, inter-
est rate caps that expire during the extended period are difficult
for a troubled project to renew, and thus lenders and investors
may face substantially increased interest rate fluctuation risks.
The dispute between HubCo and WAPDA over the Hub
project also is a case study in delay. That transaction erupted
commercial lenders and other investors back into recently unstable markets much
more promptly than observers might have expected at the time of the initial interfer-
ence.
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into commercial and political warfare in May 1997 and a final
renegotiation was not concluded until December 2000. No divi-
dends were paid to shareholders during that three and a half
year period, although the Pakistani courts did permit debt ser-
vice to continue. Still, another possible illustration of the ulti-
mate recognition by a host country of the disadvantages of driv-
ing away investment capital is the provision of the Settlement
Agreement among HubCo, WAPDA, and Pakistan ("Settlement
Agreement") by which the parties "recognize each other's right
to seek arbitration in accordance with the agreed dispute resolu-
tion mechanism contained in the Relevant Contract Documents
within the applicable legal framework.""1 3 Although it is easy to
conjecture that the phrase "within the applicable legal frame-
work" was an addition required by Pakistan and WAPDA to pre-
serve the array of tools afforded by the Pakistani legal system, the
clause demonstrates the importance to HubCo of obtaining
Pakistani recognition of arbitration as the proper dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. The presence of the clause in the Settlement
Agreement also demonstrates the willingness of Pakistan's post-
Sharif military government to grant that recognition as part of
an economic bargain reducing the project's tariffs.
Like the Paiton dispute, political intervention also charac-
terized the HubCo controversy, most notably from the World
Bank; the IMF; and the U.S., Japanese, German, and U.K. gov-
ernments, among others. Yet, at least thirty-eight months passed
before the project and the GOP composed their differences.
The limited effectiveness of political pressure on Pakistan should
not surprise the reader.'8 4 The multilateral financial institutions
and the capital-exporting countries applying that pressure were
torn by competing interests; among them, the need to assist Pa-
kistan to regain economic stability, fears of inadvertently trigger-
ing either military confrontation with India or fundamentalist
upheaval within Pakistan, the drive to increase transparency and
183. Section 3(b) of Settlement Agreement among HubCo, WAPDA, and Pakistan,
as quoted in Anwar, supra note 115.
184. It may be too severe to characterize the effectiveness of the pressure as lim-
ited. Instead, it might be more accurate to describe that pressure as operating on a
time scale far slower than might be hoped by project investors and lenders. Although
only an opening of Pakistani records could prove the case, it is quite possible that but
for concerted political pressure by the multilaterals, Western governments, and Japan,
the consequences to HubCo would have been far worse.
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reduce corruption in emerging markets, maintaining the integ-
rity of the market-economy system of international investment,
and the responsibility to assist in preserving the security of inter-
national investment in order to promote economic develop-
ment. For the World Bank and the IMF, cutting off credit to the
Government of Pakistan as a lever to compel Pakistan to respect
the terms of the IPP contracts risked total disintegration of the
Pakistani economy and the failure of the raison d'etre of these
organizations to participate in Pakistani affairs. Equally, the
U.K., Japanese, and German governments recognized that, given
Pakistan's lack of foreign exchange reserves, the only source of
vital hard currency to cover WAPDA's tariff obligations to the
IPPs and Pakistan's current trade obligations was fresh funds
from the IMF and World Bank. Sharing the concerns of those
institutions and governments, the United States was even more
conflicted as it also was the only power capable of talking Paki-
stan and India away from nuclear confrontation. Thus are the
strong made weak.
If local justice is uncertain and political pressure does not
prove to be the simple swift answer to a lack of respect for con-
tract clauses, then project sponsors must look to their own de-
vices for protection. Those without the desire for, or access to,
equity political risk insurance will consider whether means exist
of altering the incentives embedded into the project transaction
to encourage host States to comply with contract obligations and
arbitration clauses. However, realigning economic interests
does not always succeed in inducing moderate conduct. States
that have made the decision to cease paying tariffs or otherwise
honoring project obligations have also made the decision to
forego the services purchased by compliance with those obliga-
tions, in this case the electricity generated by the power projects.
In making that choice, both PLN and WAPDA were undoubtedly
influenced by the recognition that, in light of the financial crises
in their respective countries, an over-supply of power would now
exist in their countries for several years. Absent constraints cre-
ated by a crisis of insufficient power, the long-held anti-IPP senti-
ments of these monopoly State utilities and their employees were
free to rise to the surface again. Accordingly, State power utili-
ties in neither country had a positive incentive to cooperate.
It has also been important to investors to structure their
transactions in a manner that compels the involvement of other
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crucial public actors in the host State at times of dispute. These
investment arrangements are often structured to impose a cost
on other important local participants if the Ministry or utility
most closely connected with the transaction engages in scorched
earth tactics. It may also well serve project investors to consider
building into their project structures a means of imposing on
the defaulting party a material economic penalty as the price for
non-compliance with arbitration clauses. One possible vehicle
for this approach is to expand the scope of standby letters of
credit issued by host State counterparties under project docu-
ments and concessions, so that the letters of credit secure com-
pliance with submissions to arbitration, not solely tariff and
other financial commitments. For such a course to be effective,
however, the letter of credit obligors must be located outside the
reach of local court action and, arguably, outside the reach of
local political threats as well. Such letters of credit are often of a
size sufficient to gain the attention of senior government offi-
cials seated at the Ministry of Finance rather than whichever
sectoral Ministry holds the keys to cooperation with the project.
Another potential device is to require the Ministry of Finance to
issue directly to supporting Western governments financial assur-
ances of economic and commercial performance by other State
entities of project document obligations. Like political pressure,
the effectiveness of these devices may also be limited. So, for
example, the contingent liabilities created by the Pakistani
counter-indemnities in favor of the World Bank and JEXIM in
the HubCo transaction did not necessarily moderate the con-
duct of WAPDA or the GOP. 8 ' Similarly, existence of the MoF
Letters in the Indonesian cases was not an obvious source of cool
water to douse hot flames of emotion and turmoil. Spreading
185. See Hill, supra note 4 (arguing that HubCo's decision in September 1999 to
make claims leading to call on World Bank partial risk guarantee "set the full might of
the World Bank and the IMF into action to settle both the HubCo and the wider IPP
issues"). Hill was perhaps premature. As events ultimately developed, another 14
months would pass after that article was published before the Settlement Agreement
ended the HubCo dispute. While perhaps swift by sovereign and multilateral standards,
that pace of negotiations is painfully slow and costly by commercial standards. Moreo-
ver, access to the World Bank's partial risk guarantee is not assured. The terms of the
guarantee compel the beneficiary to demonstrate that the project company's payment
default on its covered loan was directly caused by breach of contract by the host State.
The World Bank may require an arbitral award supporting that determination prior to
making payment under the guarantee. Such a process is, of course, lengthy and uncer-
tain.
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the pain towards the most important host government authori-
ties does not appear to be a silver bullet for these problems.
Letters of credit, and other devices for reallocating risk that
may be created through the ingenuity of investors and their
counsel, are thus not likely to eliminate the problems faced by
IPPs in countries like Indonesia and Pakistan; not when the un-
derlying causes are economic and political upheaval, rampant
corruption, weak States, and contracts that allocate the risk of
adverse macroeconomic events solely to the account of such
States. It may, therefore, be the case that, in the end, arbi-
trability is indeed a fiction in such circumstances.
